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Application of the Federal Mail and Wire
Fraud Statutes to Criminal Liability For
Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping
WILLIAM K.S. WANG*1
SEC Rule 10b-5 covers a great deal of stock market insider
trading and tipping, but certainly not all. For insider trading
defendants, some elements of criminal liability may be different and possibly easier to satisfy under mail/wire fraud
than under SEC Rule 10b-5 (e.g., materiality, and the requirements for tipper and tippee liability recently tightened
for Rule 10b-5 by the Second Circuit). Generally, courts
have not addressed these possible differences.
With insider trading and tipping, the victim of mail/wire
fraud could be either the information-owner or the party on
the other side of the transaction. The courts have not examined the latter victim and the possibility that such mail/wire
fraud liability might be broader than under the Rule 10b-5
“classical relationship.” Another unexplored question is
whether an employee of a company engaging in an insider
trade of its stock could be criminally liable under two different mail/wire fraud theories with two separate mail/wire

*

Professor, University of California Hastings College of Law. I would like
to thank Ms. Kwan Wang and Professors Abe Cable, John Crawford, and Tom
Joo for valuable comments on the manuscript. I gratefully acknowledge the help
of my research assistants, Ms. Margaret Greer, Ms. Pardeis Heidari, and Ms. Danielle Tustin, and of my library liaison, Mr. Tony Pelczynski.
1
This Article draws upon WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG,
INSIDER TRADING (Oxford U. Press, 3d ed. 2010).
220

2015] MAIL, WIRE FRAUD STATUTES FOR INSIDER TRADING AND TIPPING

221

fraud victims: the company/information-owner and the party
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INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses the application of the federal mail fraud2
and wire fraud3 statutes to criminal liability for stock market insider
trading and tipping, and whether, for this conduct, mail/wire fraud
might be broader than SEC Rule 10b-5.4 For example, for mail/wire
fraud, materiality may have a standard that is (1) laxer (beyond “reasonable person”) or, (2) in cases involving deprivation of informational property, different (importance to the owner of the information as opposed to a stock market investor).5
In addition, for mail/wire fraud, as opposed to Rule 10b-5 fraud,
tipper and tippee liability may be more extensive.6 Recently, under
Rule 10b-5, the Second Circuit made it more difficult for the prosecution to demonstrate the “personal benefit” requisite for the initial

2
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). The essence of the statute has been in effect since
1872. See Peter J. Henning, Maybe it Should Just be Called Federal Fraud: The
Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435, 441 (1995)
(“The essential structure of the statute has remained consistent since its enactment
in 1872.”).
For a discussion of the origins of the mail fraud statute, see id. at 441–50; ELLEN
S. PODGOR ET AL., WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 4.1(A), at 71–73 (West 2013) (describing its origins in recodifications in 1872, 1889, and 1909); C.J. Williams,
What Is the Gist of the Mail Fraud Statute?, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 287, 287–96
(2014); Brette M. Tannenbaum, Note, Reframing the Right: Using Theories of
Intangible Property to Target Honest Services Fraud After Skilling, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 359, 364–69 (2012). For an extensive discussion of the history and early
interpretation of the statute, see Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute
(Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771 (1980). For criticism of the breadth of the mail fraud
statute, see Todd E. Molz, Comment, The Mail Fraud Statute: An Argument for
Repeal by Implication, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 983 (1997).
3
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
4
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). For a discussion of the application of Rule
10b-5 to stock market insider trading, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, chs.
4, 5.
The SEC adopted Rule 10b-5 pursuant to Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
5
For a discussion of this issue, see infra Part II(B)(4).
6
For a discussion of whether the Rule 10b-5 “personal benefit” test for the
initial tipper and the “know or should have known” test for the tippee applies to
mail/wire fraud, see infra Part II(B)(5).
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tipper7 and to demonstrate the requirement that the tippee “knows or
should know” of the initial tipper’s violation.8
With insider trading and tipping, the victim of mail/wire fraud
could be either the information-owner or the party on the other side
of the transaction. Courts have not explored the latter victim and the
possibility that such mail/wire fraud liability might be broader than
under the Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship.”9 Nor have the courts
considered whether an employee engaging in an insider trade of her
company’s shares could be criminally liable under two different
mail/wire fraud theories with two separate mail/wire fraud victims:
the company/information-owner and the party on the other side of
the transaction.10

7

See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 451–53 (2d Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 2015 WL 4575840 (U.S., Oct. 5, 2015). For additional discussion of this
portion of Newman, see infra notes 218–28 and accompanying text.
8
See Newman, 773 F.3d at 453–55. For additional discussion of this portion
of Newman, see infra notes 218–19 and accompanying text. In Newman, the government did not charge the defendants with mail/wire fraud. See 773 F.3d at 442–
43.
9
For discussion of this question, see infra Part II(B)(2).
10
For discussion of this issue, see infra Part II(B)(3).
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II.

SOME ELEMENTS OF MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
The mail and wire fraud provisions prohibit the “use” of the
mails (or “private interstate carrier”)11 or the “use” of “wire communication”12 to further a “scheme to defraud.”13 One treatise notes:

11

The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or
to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute,
supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit
or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or
thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or
deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever
to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate
carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing,
or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is
directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed,
any such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation occurs
in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized, transported,
transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with,
a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency (as those
terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122)),
or affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not
more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or
both.

In 1994, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 1341 to extend its coverage to anyone
who “deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent
or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier.” Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–332, § 250006, 108 Stat.
1796, 2087. See Brandon Weston, Note, Annual Survey of White Collar Crime:
Mail and Wire Fraud, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1423, 1425 n.12, 1433 n.68 (2014).
Thus, when discussing the mail fraud statute, this Article will use “mail” to include the use of both the United States Postal Service and a private or commercial
interstate carrier.
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For a discussion of the meaning of “private or commercial interstate carrier,” see
Henning, supra note 1, at 469–76. Professor Henning concludes that “the Government must prove that the business of the company . . . involves significant
interstate shipments, and not just that the general business has an effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at 474. For additional discussion, see 2 KATHLEEN F.
BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 8:56.10 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp.
2014); Williams, supra note 2, at 302–03. United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 100
(2d Cir. 2002), concluded “[A]pplication of the mail fraud statute to intrastate
mailings sent or delivered by private or commercial interstate carriers [in this case,
Federal Express], is a permissible exercise of Congress’s power [under the Commerce Clause] . . . .”. Accord United States v. Hasner, 340 F.3d 1261, 1270 (11th
Cir. 2003).
For a discussion of jurisdiction and venue under the mail/wire fraud statutes, see
Jack E. Robinson, The Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes: Correct Standards
for Determining Jurisdiction and Venue, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 479 (2008).
12
The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,
transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio,
or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce,
any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose
of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized,
transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with, a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency (as those terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42
U.S.C. 5122)), or affects a financial institution, such person
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more
than 30 years, or both.
Section 902 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 amended 18 U.S.C. chapter 63,
containing the mail and wire fraud provisions, to provide: “Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this chapter shall be subject to
the same penalties as those prescribed for the offence, the commission of which
was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2012). For discussion of this amending provision, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1,
§ 7.2.1, 617 n.24; Ann Marie Tracey & Paul Fiorelli, Nothing Concentrates the
Mind Like the Prospect of a Hanging: The Criminalization of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 125, 144–47 (2004) (noting that under the new provision
(1) the prosecution need neither allege nor prove an overt act and (2) prosecutors
are not required to use 18 U.S.C. § 1349 as opposed to 18 U.S.C. § 371 (the general conspiracy statute) and, therefore, in plea bargaining, can offer the defendant
either the 20-year charge of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 or the 5-year charge of 18 U.S.C.

226

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:220

“One finds wire fraud charges premised on telephone calls, microwaves, fax transmissions, and electronic transmissions. Because of
the high use of computers, wire fraud is a common charge in a white
collar case involving a transmission via the internet.”14
The mail fraud and wire fraud statutes are two different laws,
but are interpreted similarly. Where the two statutes share the same
language, the law developed under the mail fraud statute applies to
wire fraud and vice versa.15 Allegations of securities law violations
§ 371); Jennifer S. Recine, Note, Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty
Enhancements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535, 1553–55
(2002) (concluding that the provision is not exceedingly important, except that,
where § 902 applies, plea-bargaining prosecutors will not be able to offer the
lesser maximum five-year sentence for general conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371
because § 902 would replace 18 U.S.C. § 371).
13
For a discussion of the “use” of the “mail” or “wire” and “scheme to defraud,” see infra Part II(A). For a discussion of the penalties for mail/wire fraud,
see 3 ALAN R. BROMBERG, LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, & MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN,
BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD, § 6:372 (2d ed. 2015); 2
BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:62–63; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 11.1.
For a discussion of the application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to mail
fraud, see 1 JOEL ANDROPHY, WHITE COLLAR CRIME, § 8:15 (2d ed. 2014);
CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41930, MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD: A
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 7–9 (2011) [hereinafter
OVERVIEW]; Charles Doyle, Mail and Wire Fraud: A Brief Overview of Federal
Criminal Law, in MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD: ELEMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS IN
FEDERAL CRIMES 6–7 (Eric J. Cass & Andreas N. Schuster eds., 2012) [hereinafter Doyle Chapter]; Weston, supra note 11, at 1446–47. For an empirical study of
average sentencing for mail/wire fraud, see Lucian E. Dervan, White Collar Overcriminalization: Deterrence, Plea Bargaining, and the Loss of Innocence, 101
KY. L. J. 723 (2012–13). For a discussion of the application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to insider trading generally, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra
note 1, § 7.2.2.
14
ELLEN S. PODGOR ET AL, supra note 2, § 4.9(A), at 92. See also Rose v.
United States, 227 F.2d 448, 449 (10th Cir. 1955) (stating wire fraud statute’s
language is “broad enough to include an interstate telephonic communication”).
For a discussion of when use of the internet involves the required “interstate”
communication, see infra note 56 and accompanying text.
15
See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355 n.2 (2005) (“we have
construed identical language in the wire and mail fraud statutes in pari materia.”);
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987) (“The mail and wire fraud
statutes share the same language in relevant part, and accordingly we apply the
same analysis to both sets of [insider trading/tipping] offenses here.”); United
States v. Green, 594 F.3d 1057, 1063 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.
Shipsey, 363 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2004)); United States v. McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526,
532 n.3 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); Shipsey, 363 F.3d at 971 n.10 (“It is well settled
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and mail and/or wire fraud violations are often joined in a single
indictment.16
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue, lower
courts have uniformly held that a private right of action does not
exist under the mail fraud or wire fraud statutes.17

that cases construing the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes are applicable to either.”); United States v. Mills, 199 F.3d 184, 188 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Carpenter); United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 967 n.6 (4th Cir. 1995); 2 BRICKEY,
supra note 11, §§ 8:39, 8:60; CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO WHITE COLLAR
CRIME § 2:3 (2014) [hereinafter GUIDE]; OVERVIEW, supra note 13, at 2; 2 SARAH
N. WELLING, SARA SUN BEALE, & PAMELA H. BUCY, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND RELATED ACTIONS: CRIMES, FORFEITURE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND
RICO § 17.2 (1998 & Supp. 2000); Williams, supra note 2, at 304–05; Weston,
supra note 11, at 1425.
16
For examples of insider trading cases resulting from such indictments, see
Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 19; United States v. Ruggiero, 56 F.3d 647, 649 (5th Cir.
1995); United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 114 (2d Cir. 1993); United States
v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 79 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d
12, 14 (2d Cir. 1981), aff’d after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1983) (unpublished order); United States v. Victor Teicher & Co., 726 F. Supp. 1424, 1427,
1434 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Elliott, 711 F. Supp. 425, 425–26 (N.D.
Ill. 1989). See generally United States v. Faulhaber, 929 F.2d 16, 17 (1st Cir.
1991); see id. at 19 (explaining indictment with both securities fraud and mail
fraud counts is not multiplicitous); United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679
(7th Cir. 1980) (holding the simultaneous prosecution under mail fraud statute and
another statute does not violate double jeopardy clause because the offenses involve different elements). But cf. United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1398 (2d
Cir. 1976) (noting, in non-insider trading case, that it was unnecessary for the
prosecutor to include mail fraud counts because the possible prison sentence under the Securities Exchange Act for the defendant’s activity was as much as any
judge would impose, and all the mail fraud count would accomplish was the collection of additional fines).
17
See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 501 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Prior to RICO, no federal statute had expressly provided a
private damages remedy based upon a violation of the mail or wire fraud statutes . . . .Moreover, the Courts of Appeals consistently had held that no implied
federal private causes of action accrue to victims of these federal violations.”);
Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank of Poplar Bluff, 167 F.3d 402, 407–08 (8th Cir.
1999) (mail fraud and wire fraud); Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170,
1178–79 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding no private right of action under mail fraud statute); Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding no private right of action under mail fraud statute) (citing Napper v. Anderson, 500 F.2d
634, 636 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding no private right of action under wire fraud statute)). Cf. Oppenheim v. Sterling, 368 F.2d 516, 518–19 (10th Cir. 1966) (finding
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The Supreme Court has identified the two important elements of
mail fraud as “(1) having devised or intending to devise a scheme to
defraud (or to perform specified fraudulent acts), and (2) use of the
mail for the purpose of executing, or attempting to execute, the
scheme (or specified fraudulent acts).”18 A circuit court opinion pro-

no federal question jurisdiction in civil case based on violation of mail fraud statute).
Nevertheless, mail and wire fraud violations constitute “racketeering activity” under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). See 18
U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (2012). The RICO statute creates an express private cause of
action for up to three times damages plus legal costs. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(2012). In 1995, however, Congress eliminated “conduct that would have been
actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities” as a predicate offense for
civil RICO, except after a criminal conviction in connection with the fraud. See
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, § 107 (amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c)).
An interesting question is whether, even without a criminal conviction, a private
civil RICO claim may be available if insider trading or tipping constitutes
mail/wire fraud, but does not violate securities fraud statutes. For discussion of
the ambiguity of the phrase “conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in
the purchase or sale of securities,” see WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I.
STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 12.1 (1st ed. 1996 & Supp. 2002).
18
Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 721 (1989); accord Pereira v.
United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954) (“(1) a scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing
of a letter, etc., for the purpose of executing the scheme.”). Accordingly, most
cases state that the government need prove only these two elements. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lo, 231 F.3d 471, 475 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bailey,
123 F.3d 1381, 1390 (11th Cir. 1997); Chisolm v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 95 F.3d
331, 336 (4th Cir. 1996).
Some courts phrase the test for liability in terms of three elements. For example,
one circuit court gave the following summary of the elements of mail fraud:”(1)
the defendant participated in some scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) the defendant
or someone associated with the scheme used the mails or ‘caused’ the mails to be
used, and (3) the use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the scheme.”
Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475, 481–82 (5th
Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Davis, 752 F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 1985)). See
also United States v. Crossley, 224 F.3d 847, 857 (6th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 354 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Funt, 896 F.2d 1288,
1292 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Toney, 605 F.2d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 1979).
The two-prong and three-prong tests are effectively the same.
For still other similar formulations of the elements for mail fraud, see United
States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Walker, 191
F.3d 326, 334 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Lack, 129 F.3d 403, 406 (7th Cir.
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vided a similar summary and continued: “Each mailing in furtherance of the scheme constitutes a separate violation. Intent to deceive
and knowing use of the mails are the scienter elements of mail
fraud.”19 Other courts also have stated that mail/wire fraud violations require specific intent to defraud.20

1997); United States v. Lefkowitz, 125 F.3d 608, 614 (8th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Moser, 123 F.3d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1997).
For a general discussion of the elements of mail and wire fraud, see ANDROPHY,
supra note 13, §§ 8:2–8:7; Doyle Chapter, supra note 13, at 3–6; OVERVIEW, supra note 13, at 2–7; 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, §§ 8:32–8:58; PODGOR ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 71–94; 7 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION, § 22.4 (6th ed. 2009 & 2015 Supp.); WELLING, BEALE,
& BUCY, supra note 15, §§ 17.4–17.25; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1,
§ 11.2; see generally Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Redefining the Boundaries, 10
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 557 (1998) [hereinafter cited as Boundaries]; Weston, supra
note 11, at 1426–44. For a selected bibliography on mail fraud, see Boundaries,
supra, at 573–77.
19
United States v. Vaughn, 797 F.2d 1485, 1493 (9th Cir. 1986). Citing
Vaughn, United States v. Garlick, 240 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 2001) held: “[E]ach
use of the wires under the wire fraud statute constitutes a separate offense.” Accord Weston, supra note 11, at 1427 (“Each use of the mails or wires constitutes
a separate offense and therefore can be a separate count in an indictment.”); 2
BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:56; 2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15,
§17.32(B). But cf. Williams, supra note 2 (arguing that each mailing should not
be separate offense and that Congress should amend the statute to clarify that
“scheme to defraud” should be a unit of prosecution, not each individual mailing).
20
See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987) (discussed
below); United States v. Wynn, 684 F.3d 473, 478 (4th Cir. 2012); United States
v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Rajwani, 476
F.3d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 2007) (requiring “conscious knowing intent to defraud”)
(citing United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722, 736 (5th Cir. 2001)); United States
v. Novak, 443 F.3d 150, 156–59 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing evidence sufficient
for showing of intent); United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1104 (10th Cir.
2003); United States v. Haber, 251 F.3d 881, 887 (10th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 973 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Bouyea, 152 F.3d
192, 194 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 354 (6th Cir. 1997);
Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499 (11th Cir. 1991) (“‘conscious knowing
intent to defraud’” required).
For a lengthy discussion of the “fraudulent intent” requirement in wire and mail
fraud, see Powers v. British Vita, P.L.C., 57 F.3d 176, 184–87 (2d Cir. 1995). For
other discussions of the intent requirement, see 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:51;
2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15, §§ 17.20–17.25; Doyle Chapter, supra note 13, at 5; Weston, supra note 11, at 1429–32.
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In the leading insider trading mail/wire fraud case, Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19 (1987),
the Supreme Court noted: “[T]he District Court’s conclusion that each of the petitioners acted with the required specific intent to defraud is strongly supported
by the evidence.” Id. at 28 (emphasis added). The principal defendant, Winans,
was one of two authors of a column in the Wall Street Journal; Winans conspired
with other defendants to profit through trading stocks based on the column’s probable impact. See id. at 22–23. The Court found that Winans had a specific intent
to defraud his employer, the Wall Street Journal. See id. at 28. The employee
manual declared that the “Journal’s business information that it intended to be
kept confidential was its property . . . .” Id. Winans demonstrated his awareness
of the policy when he twice told his editors of leaks by other employees. See id.
For related discussion of the discussion of intent in the circuit court and trial court
opinions below, see infra notes 244, 250 and accompanying text.
The court in United States v. Dobson, 419 F.3d 231, 236–39 (3d Cir. 2005), held
that the defendant must knowingly participate in a fraudulent scheme: “Unwitting
participation in a fraudulent scheme is not criminal under § 1341. Moreover, the
relevant inquiry is not whether the defendant acted knowingly in making any misstatement, but whether she did so with respect to the overarching fraudulent
scheme . . . .” Id. at 237 (citing United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 537 (3d
Cir. 1978)).
The court in United States v. Akpan stated that the “defendant acts with the intent
to defraud when he ‘acts knowingly with the specific intent to deceive for the
purpose of causing pecuniary ‘loss to another or bringing about some financial
gain to himself.’’” 407 F.3d 360, 370 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v.
Blocker, 104 F.3d 720, 732 (5th Cir. 1997)).
In United States v. Given, the court noted with approval that the trial court had
used the circuit’s pattern instruction: “When the word ‘knowingly’ is used in these
instructions, it means that the defendant realized what he was doing and was aware
of the nature of his conduct, and did not act through ignorance, mistake or accident.” 164 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting the Seventh Circuit’s instruction).
The jury may infer intent from circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., United States v.
Daniel, 749 F.3d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Howard, 619 F.3d
723, 727 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rogers, 321 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir.
2003); United States v. Owens, 301 F.3d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 2002); United States
v. Britton, 289 F.3d 976, 981 (7th Cir. 2002). See also United States v. Maxwell,
579 F.3d 1282, 1301 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A jury may infer an intent to defraud from
the defendant’s conduct.”); 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:51, at 133 (“Direct
proof of fraudulent intent is not required.”); Weston, supra note 11, at 1430.
For a discussion of whether the defendant must intend to injure the alleged victim
of the fraud, see Welch, 327 F.3d at 1104–06; United States v. Kenrick, 221 F.3d
19, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2000) (discussing intent required by defendant); United States
v. Rossomando, 144 F.3d 197, 199–201 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing jury instruction
on defendant’s required intent); Boundaries, supra note 18, at 566–68; Elkan
Abramowitz, ‘Intent to Harm’ in Federal Statute on Mail Fraud, N.Y.L.J., May
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5, 1998, at 3 (discussing how the prosecution need only show defendant’s intent
to harm victims).
Some opinions have equated “reckless indifference” or “willful blindness” to specific intent to defraud. See, e.g., United States v. Epstein, 426 F.3d 431, 440–41
(1st Cir. 2005) (approving “willful blindness” jury instructions); United States v.
Titchell, 261 F.3d 348, 351 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d
1117, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000), superseded on other grounds by statute, U.S
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1. (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015),
as recognized in United States v. Hymas, 780 F.3d 1285, 1287 (9th Cir. 2015)
and United States v. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 125–26 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Trammell, 133 F.3d 1343, 1352 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The ‘schemer’s indifference to the
truth of statements can amount to [evidence of] fraudulent intent.’”) (quoting
United States v. Reddeck, 22 F.3d 1504, 1507 (10th Cir. 1994)); United States v.
Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Proof of specific intent is required . . .
which ‘may be found from a material misstatement of fact made with reckless
disregard for the truth.’”) (quoting United States v. Hannigan, 27 F.3d 890, 892
n.1 (3d Cir. 1994)); United States v. Duncan, 29 F.3d 448, 450 & n.1 (8th Cir.
1994); United States v. Reddeck, 22 F.3d 1504, 1507 (10th Cir. 1994). See also
United States v. Carlo, 507 F.2d 799, 802 (2d Cir. 2007) (approving charge that
defendant “had actual knowledge that his statements were false or, in the alternative, that he was aware of a high probability that they were false, but consciously
avoided confirming that suspicion”); 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:48, at nn.
584–88 and accompanying text (actual knowledge of falsity and deliberate avoidance of the truth may be treated the same); id. § 8:51, nn.639, 654.25, 654.30
(citations of opinions endorsing “willful blindness” or “reckless indifference”);
OVERVIEW, supra note 13, at 5; OTTO G. OMERMAIER & ROBERT G. MORVILLO,
WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 9:03 (2013); 2
WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15, § 17.8; Weston, supra note 11, at 1431
(“intent requirement can be satisfied by proof of a reckless disregard or indifference for the truth of one’s representations”). Cf. United States v. Ferguson, 676
F.3d 260, 267, 277–79 (2d Cir. 2011) (in case involving conspiracy, mail fraud,
securities fraud, and false statement made to the SEC, allowing a “conscious
avoidance” jury instruction under the circumstances of the case). See generally
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2066, 2070–72 (2011) (discussing “willful blindness” in a civil patent infringement trust case); Samuel W.
Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 567 (2011); Michael Clay
Smith, Recklessness and Good Faith Under the Mail Fraud Statute: Mens Rea by
Accident?, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 315 (1991); J. Kelly Strader, (Re)Conceptualizing
Insider Trading: United Sates v. Newman and the Intent to Defraud, 80 BROOK.
L. REV. 1419 (2015) (discussing Global Tech and “willful blindness” in criminal
cases generally and in Rule 10b-5 insider trading cases).
For discussion of the Rule 10b-5 scienter requirement and its application to insider
trading defendants, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4.4. For discussion
of the special features of the Rule 10b-5 scienter of tippers and tippees, see id.
§ 4.4.5.
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Further, courts have found violations where the fraudulent
scheme did not succeed. In other words, a failed attempt is still a
“scheme to defraud” under the mail and wire fraud statutes.21
21
See United States v. Pimental, 380 F.3d 575, 585 (1st Cir. 2004); United
States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“actual or intended . . . harm to the victim need not be established”); United States v. Yeager,
331 F.3d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Tadros, 310 F.3d 999,
1006 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cherif, 943 F.2d 692, 698–99 (7th Cir.
1991) (finding defendant still violates the mail and wire fraud statutes even if defendant attempts to trade on confidential information but in fact traded on public
information, i.e., defendant “was unlucky or a bad judge of the value of the information”); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943 (4th Cir. 1995), abrogated by
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997); ANDROPHY, supra note 13,
§ 8:3; 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:58; OVERVIEW, supra note 13, at 4; Weston,
supra note 11, at 1428 (“the government need not show that the scheme was successful”); id. at 1437 (“success of the scheme is not required”). See also Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1999) (“The common-law requirements of ‘justifiable reliance’ and ‘damages,’ for example, plainly have no place in the federal
fraud statutes [including mail and wire fraud] . . . .[T]he elements of reliance and
damage would clearly be inconsistent with the statutes Congress enacted.”).
As mentioned earlier, section 902 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 amended 18
U.S.C. chapter 63 (containing the mail and wire fraud provisions) to provide:
“Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this chapter
shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offence, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C. § 1349
(emphasis added). For additional discussion of this provision, see supra note 12.
Under Rule 10b-5, a failed attempt is also illegal. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra
note 1, § 5.2.8[F], at nn.467–78.
Section 807 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes criminal penalties for:
“[w]hoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice . . .
[to commit fraud in connection with a publicly traded security].” 18 U.S.C. § 1348
(2012) (emphasis added). For a discussion of this provision, see RALPH C.
FERRARA, DONNA M. NAGY, & HERBERT THOMAS, FERRARA ON INSIDER
TRADING AND THE WALL §§ 1.02[2], 2.03[2] (2014); WANG & STEINBERG, supra
note 1, §§ 7.2.1, at n.17, nn.25–26, and accompanying text.
For the upholding of a jury conviction under § 1348, see United States v. Mahaffy,
693 F.3d 113, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2012). For discussion of both Section 807 and
Mahaffy, see David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement
in White Collar Crime, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1435–37 (2008).
For the upholding of a “conscious avoidance” jury instruction under both mail
fraud and § 1348, see United States v. Stinn, 379 F. App’x 19, 20–21 (2d Cir.
2010).
The Supreme Court has expressly reserved deciding whether a tippee may violate
Rule 10b-5 if she erroneously thinks she has material nonpublic information and
trades upon it. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299,
312 n.21 (1985). Nevertheless, several lower courts have stated that such a tippee
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Mail/wire fraud is an inchoate crime that applies to someone
who devises a scheme to defraud, causes a requisite use of the mail
or wires for the purpose of executing the scheme, and does nothing
more to implement the scheme. Indeed, the mail and wire fraud statutes broadly apply to someone who “having devised or intending to
devise any scheme or artifice to defraud . . . “22 In the words of the
Supreme Court, “[t]he elements of the offense of mail fraud . . . are
(1) a scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing of a letter, etc., for the
purpose of executing the scheme.”23

may be liable for attempting to violate Rule 10b-5. See Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.,
412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969) (discussing a tippee who traded on information
that he thought was material and nonpublic but turned out to be fictitious: “[W]e
are not convinced of any difference in substance between a successful fraud and
an attempt. The statutory phrase ‘any manipulative or deceptive device,’ . . . seems
broad enough to encompass conduct irrespective of its outcome.”); Grumet v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336, 340 (D.N.J. 1983); Summerlin v.
Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., [1982–1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 99,197, at 95,793 n.6 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 1983). See also Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1161 (3d Cir. 1977), overshadowed by Bateman, 472 U.S. 299 (“There is no dispute regarding the nature of the securities law
violations committed by the plaintiffs [who incorrectly believed they were trading
on inside information].”); Schick v. Steiger, 583 F. Supp. 841, 847, 847 n.32 (E.D.
Mich. 1984); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 54–55,
55 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Cf. Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89, 91 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (quoting Kuehnart with approval, and finding plaintiff cannot recover damages if she has unclean hands).
22
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (emphasis added). For the language of the statutes, see supra notes 11, 12.
In contrast, Exchange Act § 10(b) forbids the “use or employ[ment of] . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Inter
alia, Rule 10b-5 prohibits the “employ[ment of] any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud . . . .” and “engag[ing] in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit . . . .” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
23
Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954). Accord Schmuck v. United
States, 489 U.S. 705, 721 (1989) (quoted supra at text accompanying note 17).
See United States v. Carrington, 96 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1996) (“The crime of wire
fraud does not require that the defendant’s object be attained. It only requires that
the defendant devise a scheme to defraud and then transmit a wire communication
for the purposes of executing the scheme. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343.”); 2 Brickey,
supra note 11, § 8:58, at n.724 (citing Pereira).
For discussion of the requisite use of the mail or wires, see infra Part II(A).
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II. APPLICATION OF MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD TO CRIMINAL
LIABILITY FOR STOCK MARKET INSIDER TRADING AND TIPPING
A. Use of the Mails or Wires “In Furtherance” of the
Fraudulent Scheme of Stock Market Insider Trading or
Tipping
A defendant can be convicted under the mail fraud or wire fraud
statutes even if she (or her associate) has not personally used the
mails or wires. The defendant, or her associate,24 need only knowingly “cause” something to be delivered by mail (or “private interstate carrier”),25 or “cause” a use of the wires.26 The Supreme Court
has interpreted such “causing” to include the performance of “an act
with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary
course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen,

24
See United States v. Funt, 896 F.2d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 1990) (“‘so long
as one participant in a fraudulent scheme causes a use of the mails in execution of
the fraud, all other knowing participants in the scheme are legally liable for that
use of the mails’”) (quoting United States v. Toney, 598 F.2d 1349, 1355 (5th Cir.
1979)); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1151 (7th Cir. 1974) (convicting
co-schemers “[o]f the mailing of a letter which one of [their] partners caused to
be mailed in the execution of the scheme.”).
25
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (for the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, see supra note 11). See
Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8; OVERVIEW, supra note 13, at 3; Joseph E. Edwards, Annotation, What Constitutes “Causing” Mail to be Delivered for Purpose of Executing Scheme Prohibited by Mail Fraud Statute (18 U.S.C. § 1341), 9 A.L.R.
Fed. 893, § 4 (1971).
The mailing can be established by circumstantial evidence. See United States v.
Joshua, 648 F.3d 547, 550–51 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Sprick, 233 F.3d
845, 854 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating prosecution must still bear the burden of demonstrating to the jury the use of the mails beyond a reasonable doubt); United States
v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 571 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Griffith, 17 F.3d
865, 874 (6th Cir. 1994).
For an example of a case finding that the government had not proven, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that a letter was actually mailed rather than, say, hand delivered,
see United States v. Spirk, 503 F.3d 619, 623 (7th Cir. 2007).
For discussion of the 1994 amendment to the mail fraud statute to extend coverage
to “any private or commercial interstate carrier,” see supra note 11.
26
See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (for the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, see supra note 12).
For typical types of “wire” communication, see supra text accompanying note 14.
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even though not actually intended . . . .”27 The actual mailing can be
by an innocent party who is not part of the scheme.28
The use of the mails or wires must also be “in furtherance” of
the fraudulent scheme.29 Nevertheless, the mailing need not be an
essential element of the scheme, but rather need only be “incident to
an essential part of the scheme”30 or some step in the scheme.31 Routine mailings that are innocent in themselves can satisfy the mailing

27

Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8–9. See United States v. Green, 964 F.2d 365, 369
(5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1195 (2d Cir. 1991);
Edwards, supra note 25, §§ 2[a], 4, 7, 9. Cf. Rakoff, supra note 2, at 775–76 (noting a foreseeable use of mails required to compensate for the absence of statutory
language requiring intent to use mails). For related discussion, see infra note 53
and accompanying text.
28
See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 711–15 (1989) (mailing by
innocent victims); Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8–9 (mailing by innocent bank that mailed
check cashed by defendant); United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440, 441–43
(1917) (mailing by innocent insurance company); United States v. Cooper, 596
F.2d 327, 329–30 (8th Cir. 1979) (mailing by non-defendant bank); United States
v. Moss, 591 F.2d 428, 436 (8th Cir. 1979) (mailing by defendant’s insurance
agent who was not part of the scheme).
In the insider trading case, Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a former columnist for the Wall Street Journal and his
co-defendants based on the innocent company’s use of the mails and wires to distribute the newspaper. See 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987). The columnist and his tippees
profited by trading stocks in advance of the column’s publication. See id. at 23.
For additional discussion of Carpenter’s analysis of the requisite use of the mails
and the wires, see infra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. For discussion of
Carpenter’s analysis of the requisite “scheme to defraud,” see infra Part II(B)(1).
29
See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 710 (statute only reaches frauds “in which the
use of the mails is a part of the execution of the fraud”) (quoting Kann v. United
States, 323 U.S. 88, 95 (1944)); United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399–401
(1974), superseded in bank fraud cases by bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344
(2012); United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 76–81 (1962); Parr v. United
States, 363 U.S. 370, 389–91 (1960); Kann, 323 U.S. at 93–95.
The defendant need not personally cause the mailing or the use of the wires. See
United States v. Powell, 576 F.3d 482, 493 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States
v. Turner, 557 F.3d 657, 666 (7th Cir. 2008)); 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:54.
30
Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 710–11; Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8.
31
See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 710–11; Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391,
394 (1916); OVERVIEW, supra note 13, at 3.
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requirement, provided that the routine mailings advance the fraudulent scheme32 and would not be mailed but for the scheme.33 In any

32
See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 711, 714–15; OVERVIEW, supra note 13, at 3; 2
WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15, § 17.28(A); Weston, supra note 11, at
1436.
Routine mailings that are designed to “lull the victims into a false sense of security” advance the fraudulent scheme. See Maze, 414 U.S. at 403 (distinguishing
Sampson, 371 U.S. at 79–81); United States v. Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d 573, 582
(6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Stein, 37 F.3d 1407, 1409 (9th Cir. 1994). For
additional discussion of “lulling,” see 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:53, at nn.663,
669, 671.25, 688–91 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how to treat posttransaction “lulling” mailings, see infra note 34.
Nevertheless, even routine mailings that do not lull the victims may still satisfy
the mailing requirement. See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 715 (even “mailings that someday may contribute to the uncovering of a fraudulent scheme . . . [can] supply the
mailing element of the mail fraud offense”); OVERVIEW, supra note 13, at 3. For
additional discussion of Schmuck, see infra notes 36–42 and accompanying text.
For a holding that a mailing of bank statements did not aid nor further the fraudulent scheme, even though the bank account itself was an essential part of the
scheme, see United States v. Hartsel, 199 F.3d 812, 814, 816–18 (6th Cir. 1999).
For a holding that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
particular wire transfer was part of a particular fraudulent scheme, see United
States v. Jedynak, 45 F. Supp. 3d 812, 817–21 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (finding where
non-fraudulently obtained funds in account were sufficient to cover wire transfer,
government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that fraudulently obtained
funds were in the wire transfer).
33
See United States v. Mitchell, 744 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1984); Weston,
supra note 11, at 1436. In Parr v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a
local school district’s mailings of tax statements and receipts were not in furtherance of a scheme to misappropriate and embezzle the school district’s funds and
property. See 363 U.S. 370, 385–92 (1960). The reason was that the school district
was compelled by law to collect and assess the taxes. See id. For a discussion of
Parr, see United States v. Lake, 472 F.3d 1247, 1256 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Most . . .
circuits to address the issue have interpreted Parr to hold that ‘mailings of documents which are required by law to be mailed, and which are not themselves false
and fraudulent, cannot be regarded as mailed for the purpose of executing a fraudulent scheme.’”) (quoting United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406, 412 (5th Cir.
1982)).
In Mitchell, the defendant’s mailings were also required by law to be sent, but the
Ninth Circuit distinguished Parr: “The tax statements, checks, and receipts mailed
in Parr . . . would have been mailed even if the scheme to defraud . . . had not
existed. In Mitchell’s case, the fraudulent scheme triggered the mailings, which
would not have occurred except as a step in the scheme.” Mitchell, 744 F.2d at
704.
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event, the mailing apparently must occur before the “termination”
of the fraudulent scheme.34
Nevertheless, the definition of the scheme can be quite broad.35
For example, Schmuck v. United States36 involved a defendant who
bought used cars, rolled back their odometers, and then sold the automobiles to Wisconsin retail dealers at inflated prices.37 The duped
retail dealers would ultimately resell the cars to members of the public.38 To transfer title, the retailers would mail a title application
form to the Wisconsin Department of Transportation.39 The Supreme Court held that “a rational jury could have found that the titleregistration mailings were part of the execution of the fraudulent
34

A number of Supreme Court decisions have held that a mailing was insufficiently connected to the fraudulent scheme because it took place after the
scheme had reached “fruition.” See Maze, 414 U.S. at 399–05; Parr, 363 U.S. at
370; Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 93–95 (1944). But see United States v.
Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727, 741 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding post-fraud communication
to be mail or wire fraud if intended to “‘lull the victims into a false sense of security, postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the
apprehension of the defendants less likely.’”) (quoting Maze, 414 U.S. at 403);
United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1244–45 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting United
States v. Otto, 742 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1984)) (“Even mailings made after the
fruits of the scheme have been received may come within the statute when they
are ‘designed to lull the victims into a false sense of security . . . .’”).
The court in United States v. Biesiadecki interpreted Schmuck v. United States,
489 U.S. 705, 711 (1989), as follows: “[T]he Supreme Court held that . . . forms
which were mailed after the fruition of the scheme to defraud, even though only
tangentially related to the scheme, were sufficient to satisfy the mailing element . . . .”). 933 F.2d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 1991). For additional discussion of “lulling,” see 2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15, § 17.28(D).
In any event, courts disagree on whether a post-fraudulent-transaction “lulling”
mailing extends the duration of the scheme. For a thorough discussion of this
question and description of other circuit views, see both the majority and concurring opinions in United States v. Tanke, 743 F.3d 1296 (9th Cir. 2014). The Tanke
majority criticized some other circuits for effectively allowing a post-scheme
mailing to satisfy the mailing requirement. See id. at 1303–04. The Tanke majority
rejected these other circuit holdings as contrary to Supreme Court precedent. See
id. For additional discussion of this issue, see 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:53,
at nn.671.35, 673 and accompanying text.
35
See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 710–15 (discussed immediately below); 2
WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15, §§ 17.28(B), 17.28(D).
36
489 U.S. 705 (1989).
37
See id. at 707.
38
See id.
39
See id.
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scheme, a scheme which did not reach fruition until the retail dealers
resold the cars and effected transfers of title.”40 Additionally, “a failure of this passage of title would have jeopardized Schmuck’s relationship of trust and goodwill with the retail dealers upon whose
unwitting cooperation his scheme depended.”41 A mailing meets the
statutory requirement even if it “someday may contribute to the uncovering of a fraudulent scheme . . . and return to haunt the perpetrator of the fraud.”42
A stock market insider trader can usually foresee that the mails
or wires will be used at some stage of the transaction, including order placement, execution, and confirmation.43 A fraudulent insider
trading scheme does not terminate until at least the closing,44 when
the defendant receives the securities bought or the proceeds of the

40

Id. at 712.
Id. at 714.
42
Id. at 715.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that Schmuck could not be distinguished from
the Court’s more restrictive earlier opinions of Kann, Parr, and Maze. See id. at
722–25 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 723-24 (“For though the Government chose
to charge a defrauding of retail customers (to whom the innocent dealers resold
the cars), it is obvious that, regardless of who the ultimate victim of the fraud may
have been, the fraud was complete with respect to each car when petitioner pocketed the dealer’s money . . . .[W]e have held that the indispensability of . . . mechanical mailings, not strictly in furtherance of the fraud, is not enough to invoke
the statute.”).
For discussion of Schmuck, see 2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15,
§ 17.28; Henning, supra note 2, at 457–60; Ross Cockburn, The Mail Fraud Statute: Expanding Its Scope, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 809, 815–17 (1990). For a general
discussion of the “mailing” requirement, see Henning, supra note 2, at 450–60.
43
See Joseph J. Humke, Comment, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider
Trading Outside the Lines of Section 10(b), 80 MARQ. L. REV. 819, 844 (1997)
(“And no one can reasonably deny that virtually every modern securities transaction is conducted via the mails and/or wires.”). Cf. Int’l Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin,
812 F.2d 149, 154–55 (4th Cir. 1987) (“It will be the unusual fraud that does not
enlist the mails and wires in its service at least twice.”); Roberts v. Smith Barney,
Harris Upham & Co., 653 F. Supp. 406, 413 (D. Mass. 1986) (“A single fraudulent
event will almost always involve multiple acts of wire, mail or securities fraud.”);
B.J. Skin & Nail Care, Inc. v. Int’l Cosmetic Exch., Inc., 641 F. Supp. 563, 565
(D. Conn. 1986) (“Nearly all business dealings involve frequent use of telephones
and mail.”).
44
For a discussion of when a scheme might terminate after the closing of a
transaction, see supra note 34.
41
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securities sold.45 The exchange of money,46 securities,47 or both, ordinarily involves the use of the mails or wires.48 Furthermore, after

45

At closing, the defendant actually receives the benefit of the fraudulent
scheme. See United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[S]cheme to
defraud is not complete until the proceeds have been received”). Thus, a mailing
at the closing of an insider trade differs from the mailings in Kann, Parr, and
Maze, which “involved little more than post-fraud accounting among the potential
victims of the various schemes . . . .” Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 714.
46
For examples of mail fraud cases holding that the mailing or transportation
of a check was part of a fraudulent scheme, see Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S.
1, 8 (1954) (“[T]he mailing of the check by the bank, incident to an essential part
of the scheme, is established.”); United States v. Lennartz, 948 F.2d 363, 370 (7th
Cir. 1991) (mailing of salary checks was part of a fraudulent scheme); United
States v. Walker, 915 F.2d 1463, 1466 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that defendant’s
receipt of mailed cancelled checks can be “incident to an essential part of the
scheme”); United States v. Cavale, 688 F.2d 1098, 1112 (7th Cir. 1982) (mailing
of payment checks was part of a fraudulent scheme violating the mail fraud statute); Williams v. United States, 278 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1960); Tincher v.
United States, 11 F.2d 18, 21 (4th Cir. 1926); Headley v. United States, 294 F.
888, 889–90 (5th Cir. 1923). Cf. United States v. Franks, 309 F.3d 977, 977–78
(7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the interstate transportation of the checks was essential to a scheme’s success where defendant embezzled almost 450 checks received
by her employer and deposited the checks into defendant’s personal bank account,
and the bank then forwarded the checks for collection using interstate couriers);
United States v. Alanis, 945 F.2d 1032, 1037 (8th Cir. 1991) (requisite mailing
was insurance company’s mailing of check to defendant in settlement of fraudulent life insurance claim); United States v. Little, 687 F. Supp. 1042, 1048 (N.D.
Miss. 1988) (“Here the government alleges that the mailings of NMSC invoices,
county checks and other documents all helped the fraudulent scheme to succeed
by concealing the cash payoffs. The court is inclined to permit the government
the opportunity to prove its assertions at the trial of this matter.”). For an example
of a case referring to wire transfers of money as use of the wires, see United States
v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 95 (2d Cir. 2012). But cf. Am. Auto. Acces., Inc. v. Fishman,
175 F.3d 534, 542–43 (7th Cir. 1999) (involving plaintiffs in a private civil RICO
action who were unable to demonstrate that fraudulent checks involved use of
mail or wires; cashed checks were transported to bank by private armored car
service).
47
For a case holding that the mailing of stock certificates met the mailing
requirement, see United States v. Tallant, 547 F.2d 1291, 1298–99 (5th Cir. 1977).
48
The wire communication must be “interstate.” See infra notes 54–55 and
accompanying text. For discussion of when use of the internet involves an “interstate” communication, see infra note 55 and accompanying text.
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the transaction, the stockbrokers on both sides of the trade customarily mail or wire confirmation notifications.49 In several mail fraud
insider trading cases, the stockbrokers’ mailing of confirmation slips
constituted the required mailings.50 These various uses of the mails
49

For examples of opinions stating that the mailing of a securities transaction
confirmation slip can constitute the requisite mailing, see United States v. Lay,
612 F.3d 440, 443, 447 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964,
972 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Cohen, 518 F.2d 727, 736–37 (2d Cir.
1975).
In United States v. Ashman, the court held that, under the facts of the case, the
requirement of use of the mails or wires was met by statements sent to customers
confirming execution of trades of futures contracts at the Chicago Board of Trade.
See 979 F.2d 469, 481–83 (7th Cir. 1992).
The court in United States v. Ragan reversed the defendant’s mail and wire fraud
convictions because no reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of “causing” the fictitious trade tickets to be
transmitted via wire and then through the mail to customers of a securities firm.
See 24 F.3d 657, 659–60 (5th Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, the court apparently assumed that the mailings of the confirmation slips could constitute the requisite use
of the mail for application of the mail fraud statute. See id.
50
See, e.g., United States v. Mooney, 401 F.3d 940, 946 (8th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam), aff’d en banc, 425 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. O’Hagan,
139 F.3d 641, 652 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Cherif, 943 F.2d 692, 696–97
(7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting defendant’s attempt to parse his scheme into two separate schemes: misappropriation of information and subsequent use of information
to trade stocks; holding that the requisite mailings and wirings were those necessary to execute stock trades based on the misappropriated information); United
States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Victor
Teicher & Co., 785 F. Supp. 1137, 1151–52 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v.
Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. David, No. 86
Cr. 454 (JFK), 1986 WL 13805, at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1986).
With extensive discussion, the insider trading case of United States v. O’Hagan
held that the mailing of confirmation slips furthered the defendant’s scheme to
defraud. See 139 F.3d at 652. The court noted:
O’Hagan’s scheme to defraud involved not only the unlawful
purchases of Pillsbury securities, but also the use of the profits
obtained from the illegal trading to conceal his prior misappropriation of client funds. The confirmation slips informed O’Hagan that the Pillsbury securities had been purchased and provided him a record of his purchases.
Id.
Probably, O’Hagan would have held the same way even if the insider trading
profits were not being used to cover the misappropriation of client funds. The
opinion notes that the confirmation slips
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or wires should be sufficiently connected to the insider trading
scheme to satisfy the statutory requirement.51
Even if the execution of a stock market insider trade itself somehow involves no use of the mails or wires, the entire fraudulent
scheme at some stage is still likely to involve some use of the wires
by persons involved or not involved in the scheme.52 As with the
helped O’Hagan keep track of his numerous Pillsbury option
contract purchases made at various prices, in different quantities, with different strike prices, different expiration dates, and
from different brokers, particularly given O’Hagan’s testimony
before the SEC that he called one of his brokers after he received a confirmation slip to inquire about that option’s expiration date.
Id.
Discussed later is how the Supreme Court found the requisite use of the mail and
wires in the insider trading case of Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28
(1987). See infra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
The link between the insider trading scheme and the use of the mails can be especially close if the defendant uses various mechanisms to conceal his trading activity:
In view of the sophisticated mechanisms employed for concealment of defendant’s activities by use of foreign bank accounts,
distribution of purchase orders, and utilization of confederates
abroad, it is plain that the fraudulent scheme contemplated use
of the mails as an integral feature of its operation and an essential incident to its successful consummation.
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 21 (2d Cir. 1981) (Dumbauld, J., concurring), aff’d after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1983) (unpublished order).
51
Again, the wire communication must be “interstate.” See infra notes 54–
55 and accompanying text.
52
For typical types of “wire” communication, see supra text accompanying
note 14. See generally James D. Lawlor, Annotation, Federal Criminal Prosecutions Under Wire Fraud Statute (18 U.S.C.A. § 1343) for Use of “Blue Box” or
Similar Device Permitting User to Make Long-Distance Telephone Calls Not Reflected on Company’s Billing Records, 34 A.L.R. Fed. 278, § 1 (1977).
The wire communication element is satisfied even though part of the transmission
of a telephone call may have been carried by microwave signals. See, e.g., United
States v. Foley, 683 F.2d 273, 280 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. King, 590
F.2d 253, 255 (8th Cir. 1978). Nor need the wire transmission be regulated by the
Federal Communications Commission. See United States v. Giovengo, 637 F.2d
941, 943 (3d Cir. 1980) (involving private interstate telephone circuits leased from
AT&T by TWA).
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element of mailing, the defendant need only have “caused” the use
of the wires in the sense that she would have been able reasonably
to foresee that her acts would involve such use.53
One significant difference exists in the jurisdictional element of
the mail and wire fraud statutes. Whereas even an intrastate mailing
suffices for mail fraud,54 a wire transmission must actually pass outside the state for wire fraud.55 An interesting question is when the
53

See United States v. Gill, 909 F.2d 274, 278 (7th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Johnson, 700 F.2d 163, 177 (5th Cir. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 718
F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (affirming wire fraud convictions); United
States v. Jones, 554 F.2d 251, 253 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Conte, 349
F.2d 304, 306 (6th Cir. 1965). For related discussion, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
54
See Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 373 F.3d 251, 265 (2d Cir. 2004)
(citing United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2002)); United States v.
Photogrammetric Data Servs. Inc., 259 F.3d 229, 252 (4th Cir. 2001); Annulli v.
Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 200 n.9 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d
733, 742 (5th Cir. 1993)); United States v. Elliott, 89 F.3d 1360, 1363–64 (8th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Cady, 567 F.2d 771, 776 n.7 (8th Cir. 1977) (“It is
irrelevant that all of the mailings in this case may have been intrastate in nature . . . .”); ANDROPHY, supra note 13, § 8:5; 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8.53
n.696.50 and accompanying text; Williams, supra note 2, at 303.
Both Gil, 297 F.3d at 99–100, and Photogrammetric Data Servs., 259 F.3d at
247–52, held that Congress intended that the mail fraud statute apply to both intrastate and interstate deliveries of mail matter by private and commercial interstate carriers and that such application was a permissible exercise of Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause. For related discussion, see supra note 11.
55
18 U.S.C. § 1343. See Annulli, 200 F.3d at 200 n.9 (citing Smith v. Ayres,
845 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1988)); Bacchus Indus. v. Arvin Indus., 939 F.2d 887,
892 (10th Cir. 1991); First Pac. Bancorp v. Bro, 847 F.2d 542, 547 (9th Cir. 1988);
Ayres, 845 F.2d at 1366; United States v. Freeman, 524 F.2d 337, 339 (7th Cir.
1975); Utz v. Correa, 631 F. Supp. 592, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); ANDROPHY, supra
note 13, § 8:5; 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8.61; Guide, supra note 15, §§ 2:3,
2:7; 2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15, § 29; Williams, supra note 2, at
305.
The jurisdictional element is satisfied if “a wire communication whose origin and
ultimate destination are within a single state [is] . . . routed through another state.”
Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 373 F.3d at 265 (citing United States v. Davila, 592 F.2d
1261, 1263 (5th Cir. 1979)).
The defendant does not have to anticipate that the communication will travel outside state boundaries. See United States v. Stern, 858 F.2d 1241, 1247 (7th Cir.
1988); United States v. Blackmon, 839 F.2d 900, 908 (2d Cir. 1988); United
States v. Blassingame, 427 F.2d 329, 330 (2d Cir. 1970) (“The statute does not
condition guilt upon knowledge that interstate communication is used. The use of
interstate communication is logically no part of the crime itself. It is included in
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use of the internet involves an interstate communication under the
wire fraud statute.56

the statute merely as a ground for federal jurisdiction.”); 2 BRICKEY, supra note
11, § 8.61 n.753 and accompanying text. But cf. United States v. Bryant, 766 F.2d
370, 375 (8th Cir. 1985) (“The government must show that the accused knew or
could have foreseen that a communication in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme
was interstate, if the conduct giving rise to the scheme would not be a violation of
state law and was not itself morally wrongful.”).
56
For examples of opinions discussing this issue and upholding convictions
for wire fraud under the circumstances of the case, see United States v. Kieffer,
681 F.3d 1143, 1153–55 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Siembida, 604 F. Supp.
2d 589, 596–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that the email message in question went
from one New York address to another, but there was a stipulation among the
parties that an expert would testify that defendant’s email system servers were in
Pennsylvania and the email message in question would have gone through Pennsylvania).
United States v. Fumo, 2009 WL 1688482, *8 to *9 (E.D. Pa. 2009), held that the
wire fraud statute does not require proof that e-mails were sent interstate:
Undisputedly, the e-mails at issue were sent via the Internet.
Regardless of whether an e-mail is sent and received within the
same state, “fluctuations in internet traffic” could result in the
e-mail actually crossing state lines prior to reaching its final destination. Because such a determination is impossible, it is
legally sufficient for purposes of the “interstate commerce” requirement that the e-mails at issue were sent and received
through the Internet.
Id. at *9 (footnote committed). Accord DNJ Logistic Grp., Inc. v. DHL Express
(USA), Inc., No. 08-CV-2789 (DGT), 2010 WL 625364, at *6 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.
19, 2010) (“[R]ecent cases appear to treat any use of the internet as sufficiently
interstate in nature”).
Although dismissing the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant committed wire fraud
because of lack of “deceit,” Internet Archive v. Shell, apparently assumed that the
defendant’s use of the internet constituted the requisite use of the “wires.” See 505
F. Supp. 2d 755, 768 (D. Co. 2007).
For additional discussion of this issue, see NORMAN ABRAMS, SARA SUN BEALE,
& SUSAN RIVA KLEIN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 200-02
(5th ed. 2010); PODGOR ET AL, supra note 2, § 4.9(B), at 92; Weston, supra note
11, at 1427.
For an opinion affirming the sentence of a defendant who pled guilty to using the
internet to commit wire fraud, see United States v. Pirello, 255 F.3d 728, 732 (9th
Cir. 2001).
Two commentators have concluded: “the geography of the internet makes it likely
that messages travel across state lines, and perhaps across even national borders,
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In short, at some stage of an insider trading scheme, a mailing or
an interstate wire or telephone transmission normally will occur and
should be sufficiently related to the scheme to satisfy the statutory
requirement.57
Carpenter v. United States58 is the major case in which the Supreme Court has applied the mail and wire fraud statutes to stock
market insider trading. When discussing the required use of the
mails or wires, the decision did not focus on the mechanics of the
even if the origin and destination sites are in the same state.” Morgan Cloud &
George Shepherd, Law Deans in Jail, 77 MO. L. REV. 931, 946 (2012).
57
For discussion of the necessary connection, see supra notes 29–42 and accompanying text. For examples of mail fraud insider trading cases in which the
stockbrokers’ mailing of confirmation slips constituted the required mailings, see
supra note 49.
Both United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 939, 943 (4th Cir. 1999), and United
States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 966–67 (4th Cir. 1995), affirmed a stock market
insider trading defendant’s wire fraud conviction without discussing the requisite
use of the wires. Similarly, United States v. Ruggiero, affirmed the wire fraud
conviction of an insider trading defendant in just two paragraphs and with no discussion of what constituted the required use of the wires. See 56 F.3d 647, 656
(5th Cir. 1995). For additional discussion of Ruggiero, see infra notes 166–75,
249–52 and accompanying text.
In the insider trading case of United States v. Elliott, the indictment charged the
defendant with 34 counts of wire fraud “[s]ince the [stock] purchases were made
by wire.” 711 F. Supp. 425, 426 (N.D. Ill. 1989). Apparently, the defendant did
not contest this feature of the indictment. For additional discussion of Elliott, see
infra notes 101–03 and accompanying text, 208–14 and accompanying text.
The court in United States v. Rajaratnam refused to suppress the government’s
wiretap evidence against an insider trading defendant. See N. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH),
2010 WL 4867402, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). The government had earlier
obtained judicial authorization of the wiretaps because of probable cause that the
defendant and others were involved in a scheme that involved, inter alia, wire
fraud. See id. A related insider trading defendant, Roomy Khan, pled guilty to
wire fraud. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 2012).
In another insider trading case, United States v. Victor Teicher & Co., the prosecution pointed to an interstate telephone call in which one defendant allegedly
telephoned a co-conspirator and requested that the co-conspirator destroy a page
from a desk calendar. See 726 F. Supp. 1424, 1434–35 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The court
dismissed this count of the indictment because the telephone communication was
not for the purpose of executing the scheme or lulling the victims into a false sense
of security. See id. at 1435. The telephone call took place after the SEC had begun
an investigation. See id. Therefore, the call was part of a coverup of a completed
scheme that had already aroused suspicion. See id.
58
484 U.S. 19 (1987).
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defendants’ stock transactions. Instead, the opinion found the mailing/wiring elements satisfied because the defendants relied on the
distribution of the Wall Street Journal to further their scheme and
knew that the mails and wires would be used:
[C]irculation of the . . . column [written by one of the
defendants] was not only anticipated but an essential
part of the scheme. Had the column not been made
available to Journal customers, there would have
been no effect on stock prices and no likelihood of
profiting from the information leaked . . . .59
Later, with little discussion, the Supreme Court insider trading
case, United States v. O’Hagan,60 in effect affirmed the defendant’s
mail fraud convictions.61 The opinion did not address the defendant’s requisite use of the mails.62
B. Stock Market Insider Trading or Tipping as a Mail/Wire
“Scheme to Defraud”
1. THE INFORMATION-OWNER AS VICTIM
In the insider trading case Carpenter v. United States,63 the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the defendants’ convictions for

59

Id. at 28.
521 U.S. 642 (1997).
61
See id. at 678. For additional discussion of O’Hagan’s mail fraud holding,
see infra notes 84–96 and accompanying text. For discussion of O’Hagan’s Rule
10b-5 opinion, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 4.4.5, 4.5.2[B], 4.6, 5.4
& nn.550–53, 5.4.1[B].
62
See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 678. On remand, the Eighth Circuit found that
the mailing of the confirmation slips for O’Hagan’s purchases constituted the requisite mailings. See United States v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 652 (8th Cir. 1998).
For discussion of this opinion, see supra note 50.
63
484 U.S. 19 (1987). For additional discussion of Carpenter, see infra notes
237–51 and accompanying text.
Because the Court in Carpenter split evenly on the federal securities law questions, it did not issue an opinion on those issues. See 484 U.S. at 24.
The Supreme Court decided Carpenter after its Rule 10b-5 classical relationship
insider trading cases of Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), and Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), but before the Court’s Rule 10b-5 misappropriation
(and mail fraud) opinion in United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
60

246

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:220

violations of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes and for conspiracy.64 One of the defendants, Winans, was one of two authors of
the Wall Street Journal’s “Heard on the Street” column.65 Winans
entered into a scheme with the other defendants to buy and sell
stocks in advance of the columns’ publication in order to profit from
the columns’ probable impact on the market.66
The Court rejected the defendants’ reliance on McNally v.
United States67 for their contention that they did not obtain “money
or property” from the Journal, a necessary element of the crime under the mail and wire fraud statutes.68 McNally held that the language and legislative history of the mail fraud statute “indicates that
the original impetus behind the mail fraud statute was to protect the
people from schemes to deprive them of their money or property.”69
Thus, a violation of the statute, although not requiring a monetary
loss, mandates a showing that the interest involved is a cognizable
“property right,” whether tangible or intangible. McNally found the
citizenry’s right to good government too tenuous and ambiguous to
be encompassed by the statute.70
64

See 484 U.S. at 21–22, 28. The federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371,
provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, each shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
For discussion of § 371 and a new conspiracy provision added by section 902 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, see supra note 12; WANG &
STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 7.2.1 at 617 n.24.
65
See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 22.
66
See id. at 22–23.
67
483 U.S. 350 (1987).
68
See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25–26.
69
McNally, 483 U.S. at 356.
70
See id. at 358–61. But cf. United States v. Salvatore, 110 F.3d 1131, 1139
(5th Cir. 1997) (“We begin with the proposition that the concept of property rights
should be given a broad interpretation for the purposes of the mail fraud statute.”)
(citing McNally, 483 U.S. at 350; Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 19; United States v.
Loney, 959 F.2d 1332, 1336 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Murphy, 836 F.2d
248, 253 (6th Cir. 1988)). See generally Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12,
26 (2000) (holding, under the circumstances of the case, mail fraud statute did not
reach fraud in obtaining license from state; state had no “property” interest in license granted; not sufficient that the object of the fraud, the license, might become
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In reaction to McNally, Congress, in 1988, a year after the opinion, amended the United States Code chapter containing both the
mail and wire fraud statutes to provide expressly that “schemes to
defraud” include schemes “to deprive another of the intangible right
of honest services.”71 Nevertheless, in 2010, the Supreme Court held
in Skilling v. United States72 that the 1988 amendment covers only
bribery and kickback schemes.73 With this limitation, the amendment would not apply to stock market insider trading or tipping.

“property” in the hands of the licensee; mail fraud statute “requires the object of
the fraud to be ‘property’ in the victim’s [the grantor/state’s] hands”).
71
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012) (originally enacted as Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4508) (“For the purposes of this chapter, the
term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”). For discussion of the amendment, see Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402–11 (2010).
For discussion and criticism of the “intangible rights” doctrine under mail and
wire fraud, see John C. Coffee Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal
and Civil Law Models—and What can be Done About it, 101 YALE L.J. 1875,
1879–80 (1992); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U.
L. REV. 193, 202–08 (1991); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153,
157 (1994). See generally Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez, Honest Services Fraud as a
Criminal Breach of Fiduciary Duties: A Comparative Law Approach for Reform,
18 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 100 (2015).
72
561 U.S. 358 (2010).
73
See id. at 402–11. For discussion of Skilling and the “honest services doctrine” generally, see ANDROPHY, supra note 13, § 8:9; Charles Doyle, Deprivation
of Honest Services as a Basis for Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Convictions, in
MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD: ELEMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS IN FEDERAL CRIMES
33–67 (Eric J. Cass & Andreas N. Schuster eds. 2012); Albert W. Alschuler, Terrible Tools for Prosecutors: Notes on Senator Leahy’s Proposal to “Fix” Skilling
v. United States, 67 SMU L. REV. 501, 502–04 (2014); Sara Sun Beale, An Honest
Services Debate, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 251 (2010); Joan H. Krause, Skilling and
the Pursuit of Healthcare Fraud, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 363 (2012); Pamela Mathy,
Honest Services Fraud After Skilling, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 645, (2011); Lori A.
McMillan, Honest Services Update: Directors’ Liability Concerns After Skilling
and Black, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 149 (2011); Elizabeth R. Sheyn, Criminalizing the Denial of Honest Services after Skilling, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 27
(2011); J. Kelly Strader, Skilling Reconsidered: The Legislative-Judicial Dynamic, Honest Services Fraud, and the Ill-Conceived “Clean Up Government
Act,” 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 309 (2011); Tannenbaum, supra note 2.
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In any event, the acts in Carpenter arose before the 1988 amendment, however interpreted.74 Therefore, the Court in Carpenter distinguished McNally by unanimously finding that the relevant right
of the Journal was not the defendant Winans’ obligation of honest
service, but rather the newspaper’s “interest in the confidentiality of
the contents and timing of the ‘Heard’ column as a property right.”75
Such an interest, the Court said, is well established as a property
right,76 and encompasses “news matter.”77 Even if the defendants
did not interfere with the Journal’s use of the confidential information, the defendants did deprive the newspaper of its right to exclusive use of the information.78
Carpenter also rejected the defendants’ contention that their activities did not constitute fraudulent activity within the meaning of
the mail and wire fraud statutes.79 The Court relied on its decision
in McNally for the proposition that the statutes encompass all
schemes to deprive another of money or property: “[T]he words ‘to
defraud’ have the ‘common understanding’ of ‘wronging one in his
property rights by dishonest methods or schemes,’ and ‘usually signify the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane
74

See Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19, 21–23.
Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
76
See id. at 26 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001–04
(1984); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.10 (1983); Bd. of Trade of Chicago v.
Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250–51 (1905); 3 WILLIAM MEADE
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 857.10, 245
(rev. ed. 1986)).
In a subsequent insider trading case, the Second Circuit summarized Carpenter as
follows: “Carpenter actually holds generally that, even though ‘confidential business information’ is intangible, it ‘has long been recognized as property.’” United
States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Carpenter, 484 U.S.
at 19). Accord United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(citing Grossman, 843 F.2d at 86, in an insider trading case). For discussion of
Grossman, see infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
For criticism of the Supreme Court’s holding that confidential business information is property for the purposes of the mail and wire fraud statutes, see John
C. Coffee, Jr., Hush!: The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After
McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring Problem of Overcriminalization, 26
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121 (1988).
77
Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 26 (quoting Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press,
248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918)).
78
See id. at 26–27.
79
See id. at 27–28.
75
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or overreaching.’”80 Such conduct includes embezzlement, which is
“the fraudulent appropriation to one’s own use of [property] entrusted to one’s care by another.”81
The Journal had a property right in the exclusive use of confidential information about the columns’ timing and contents.82 In
breach of his fiduciary obligation to his employer, the defendant
Winans misappropriated this property for his own use.83
80

Id. at 27 (quoting United States v. McNally, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987)).
Id. (quoting Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 189 (1902)) (internal quotations
omitted).
82
See id. at 25–27.
83
See id. at 25–28. For an extended and insightful discussion of both Carpenter and McNally, see Craig M. Bradley, Forward: Mail Fraud After McNally
and Carpenter: The Essence of Fraud, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 573 (1988);
Coffee, supra note 76 (criticizing Carpenter); Michael R. Dreeben, Insider Trading and Intangible Rights: The Redefinition of the Mail Fraud Statute, 26 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 181, 192–94, 199–214 (1988); Tannenbaum, supra note 2, at 370,
374–75, 388 (noting Carpenter’s asymmetrical fraud; the defendant’s gain was at
the cost of innocent stock market investors, who were not victims of defendant’s
scheme to defraud the Journal of its intangible property right). For a discussion
of Carpenter’s property right analysis in the context of a general analysis of the
meaning of “property,” see Francisco J. Morales, Comment, The Property Matrix:
An Analytical Tool to Answer the Question, “Is This Property?,” 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 1125, 1146–49 (2013).
The court in United States v. Cherif applied Carpenter to affirm multiple
mail/wire fraud convictions for insider trading. See 943 F.2d 692, 696–99 (7th
Cir. 1991). The defendant had misappropriated information from a commercial
bank’s finance department. See id. at 694. The court held that the bank’s right to
exclusively use its confidential business information was “property” within the
meaning of the mail and wire fraud statutes. See id. at 697–98.
Although not a mail/wire fraud case, United States v. Mahaffy involved a charge
of conspiracy to commit securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1349
under two theories, one of which was that the defendants deprived their employer
brokerage firms of the exclusive use of confidential “squawk box” information,
which qualified as “property” under Carpenter. See 693 F.3d 113, 121 (2d Cir.
2012). One issue was whether the employers considered the information confidential. See id. at 121–24, 126–33. At trial, one of the defendant’s submitted a
jury charge that would have defined “confidential business information” along the
lines of the definition of a “trade secret.” See id. at 134. The trial judge rejected
that definition as too restrictive, and the Second Circuit agreed. See id. at 134–35.
For the actual trial court instructions, see id. For discussion of Mahaffy, see Subcommittee on Annual Review, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities,
ABA Section of Business Law, Annual Review of Federal Securities Regulation,
68 BUS. LAW. 839, 938–42 (2013).
81
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In the Supreme Court insider trading case of United States v.
O’Hagan,84 the defendant was a partner of the law firm Dorsey &
Whitney in Minneapolis, Minnesota.85 Grand Metropolitan PLC retained Dorsey & Whitney as its local counsel regarding a possible
tender offer for Pillsbury Corporation.86 O’Hagan purchased both
Pillsbury call options and stock and made a profit of more than $4.3
million when he sold after the tender offer announcement.87 The
United States Attorney prosecuted O’Hagan under fifty-seven
counts of mail fraud, securities fraud (violations of Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-588 and Rule 14e-389), and violating federal money
laundering statutes. The jury convicted O’Hagan of all fifty-seven
counts.90
One Government theory was that O’Hagan violated Rule 10b-5
by trading on material nonpublic information misappropriated from
two information sources: (1) his direct employer, the law firm of
which he was a partner, and (2) his law firm’s client, Grand Metropolitan PLC.91 A majority of the justices affirmed the validity of this
theory.92
With virtually no discussion, based on the same breach of duty
to the two information sources, all nine justices in effect affirmed
the mail fraud convictions in extremely brief opinions.93 These opinions mentioned neither the “intangible right to honest services”
See generally United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Confidential information may be considered property for the purposes of §§ 1341 and
1343.”).
84
521 U.S. 642 (1997). For additional discussion of the mail fraud portion of
O’Hagan, see supra notes 50–62 and accompanying text.
85
See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647.
86
See id.
87
See id. at 647–48.
88
For discussion of O’Hagan’s Rule 10b-5 opinion, see WANG &
STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 4.4.5, 4.5.2[B], 4.6, 5:4 & nn.550–53, 5.4.1[B].
89
For discussion of O’Hagan’s Rule 14e-3 opinion, see id. § 9.3.3.
90
See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 648–49.
91
See id. at 653, 655 n.6.
92
See id. at 649–66.
93
See id. at 677–78; id. at 679 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 680, 700–01 (Thomas, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Technically, the Court remanded to the Eighth Circuit for consideration of O’Hagan’s objections to his mail fraud convictions not considered by the Eighth Circuit. See id. at 677–78. Justice Scalia joined in this part of the majority’s opinion.
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(since dramatically narrowed by Skilling94) nor the “property right”
in the information held by both Dorsey & Whitney and its client,
Grand Metropolitan PLC.95 The majority opinion did, however, reaffirm: “Just as in Carpenter, so here, the ‘mail fraud charges are
independent of [the] securities fraud charges, even [though] both
rest on the same set of facts.’”96
On remand, in the course of affirming O’Hagan’s mail fraud
convictions and rejecting his challenge to the wording of the indictment, the Eighth Circuit briefly stated: “The indictment, reasonably
read, charges O’Hagan with the fraudulent use of confidential business information held by Grand Met and Dorsey & Whitney. Confidential business information is considered “property” as that term is
used in the federal mail fraud statute [citing Carpenter].”97
Earlier, some other mail/wire fraud cases found that a law firm
had a property interest in the client’s confidential information. For
example, United States v. Grossman,98 involved an attorney who allegedly engaged in insider trading and tipping based on information
obtained from his law firm’s client.99 The court held that the law
firm had a mail fraud property interest in the information because of
the reputational value of preserving client confidences.100
Similarly, United States v. Elliott,101 concluded that the Seventh
Circuit implicitly endorsed Grossman in FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 852
See id. at 679 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas
and Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in this part of the majority’s opinion. See
id. at 680, 700–01 (Thomas, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
On remand, the Eighth Circuit affirmed O’Hagan’s convictions on the mail fraud
and other counts. See United States v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 1998).
94
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010). For discussion of Skilling,
see supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
95
See supra citations in note 93. Justice Thomas said: “As I read the indictment, it does not materially differ with the indictment in Carpenter v. United
States . . . .” O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 700 (Thomas, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 678 (bracketed material in original) (quoting Brief
for United States 46–47).
97
United States v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 651 (8th Cir. 1998).
98
843 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988).
99
See id. at 79–82.
100
See id. at 85–86. For discussion of Grossman, see Dreeben, supra note 83,
at 208–09.
101
711 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
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F.2d 981, 992 n.21 (7th Cir. 1988).102 Elliott also stated that even
had the Seventh Circuit not endorsed Grossman, two additional reasons existed for viewing confidential information from clients as
law firm property (for the purposes of wire fraud): (1) the information is used to produce legal advice and has as much economic
value to a law firm as a word processor or a copying machine; and
(2) the information is held by the law firm for the benefit of the client, and a person has a property interest in property held for the benefit of another.103
The prosecution could finesse the issue of whether the law firm
has a property interest in client information by charging that the insider trading attorney deprived or interfered with the client’s property interest in its confidential information, rather than the law firm’s
property interest in the client information.104
Suppose the information source is a relative, rather than an employer. In some situations the information source conceivably might
have a property interest in exclusive use of the information. For example, an individual or family might have a property interest in information about its investment plans.
In United States v. Chestman,105 however, a majority of the Second Circuit en banc panel reversed the mail fraud convictions of a
defendant whose tipper had allegedly breached a confidence of a
spouse.106 The defendant, Robert Chestman, had purchased
Waldbaum, Inc. shares based on material nonpublic information
about a forthcoming tender offer for the stock.107
Chestman learned about the offer through the following chain.
Ira Waldbaum was the president and controlling shareholder of
102

See id. at 426–28.
See id. at 428.
104
United States v. Elliott held that the indictment sufficiently alleged that the
indicted law firm partner, Elliott, defrauded both his law firm and its clients of
confidential information. See id. at 428–29.
For discussion of the Supreme Court decision of O’Hagan, which, with little discussion, in effect affirmed the mail fraud convictions of a law firm partner who
traded on client information and misappropriated the informational property of
both the law firm and the client, see supra notes 84–96 and accompanying text.
For discussion of the Eighth Circuit O’Hagan opinion (on remand) that affirmed
the mail fraud convictions, see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
105
947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
106
See id. at 571.
107
See id. at 555–56.
103
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Waldbaum, Inc.108 He agreed to sell Waldbaum, Inc. to another
company and to tender his control block to this acquirer.109 Mr.
Waldbaum informed his sister, Shirley Waldbaum Witkin, about the
offer so that she could tender her shares along with his.110 Ms.
Witkin told her daughter, Susan Loeb.111 Ms. Loeb passed the news
to her husband, Keith Loeb.112 Mr. Loeb in turn relayed the information to his stockbroker, Robert Chestman.113
The sole defendant was Robert Chestman.114 The court reversed
his conviction under Rule 10b-5 because his immediate information
source (tipper), Keith Loeb, did not violate the rule.115 The decision
exonerated Keith Loeb because of lack of evidence that he either (1)
had a fiduciary relationship or its “functional equivalent” with his
wife or the initial information source (the Waldbaum family), or (2)
had accepted a duty of confidentiality when receiving the information from his wife.116
After an extensive discussion of Rule 10b-5, the opinion spent
only one paragraph on mail fraud.117 The court reversed the mail
fraud convictions for the same reason that it reversed the Rule 10b5 convictions: “The fortunes of Chestman’s mail fraud convictions
are tied closely to his securities fraud convictions . . . . [W]hatever
ethical obligation Loeb may have owed the Waldbaum family or
Susan Loeb [his wife], it was too ethereal to be protected by either
the securities or mail fraud statutes.”118
In Chestman, Judge Winter dissented from the majority’s reversal of both the Section 10(b) and mail fraud convictions.119 Unlike
108

See id. at 555.
See id.
110
See id.
111
See id.
112
See id.
113
See id.
114
See id. at 554, 556.
115
See id. at 571.
116
See id. at 567–71. For additional discussion of Chestman’s analysis of Rule
10b-5, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.3[E]. At least partly because
of Chestman, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-2, which furnishes a nonexclusive list
of three circumstances when a person has a duty of trust and confidence under the
Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine. For discussion of the rule, see id.
117
See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571.
118
See id.
119
See id. at 572–82 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109
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the majority, he expressly recognized that mail fraud and Rule 10b5 misappropriation have different foundations and could have disparate results.120 Nevertheless, after an extensive discussion of Section 10(b),121 he took only two paragraphs to support the mail fraud
convictions.122 His reason was that “under any . . . disparity in rules
the Section 10(b) charge would be harder to prove than a mail fraud
charge . . . .”123
Judge Winter is correct in noting that mail fraud and Rule 10b5 misappropriation are not equivalent. Mail fraud is based on a deprivation of money or tangible or intangible “property.” Rule 10b-5
misappropriation involves a breach of duty to the information source
(in connection with a securities transaction).124
Before the Supreme Court’s validation of the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine in United States v. O’Hagan,125 critics advanced several arguments against the theory: (1) the doctrine encompasses conduct not deceitful within the meaning of Exchange
Act section 10(b);126 (2) misappropriation is not fraud “in connec-

120

See id. at 581–82 (Winter, J., dissenting) (“Logic is therefore certainly not
a barrier to the growth of disparate rules concerning a tippee’s liability depending
on whether Section 10(b) or mail fraud is the source of law.”). For a longer quotation from the same portion of the opinion, see infra text at note 256.
121
See id. at 572–81. For related discussion, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra
note 1, § 5.4.3[E] n.753.
122
See id. at 581–82.
123
See id. at 582 (Winter J., dissenting).
124
For discussion of the misappropriation theory under Rule 10b-5, see WANG
& STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.
For examples of insider trading cases providing a significant separate analysis of
Rule 10b-5 misappropriation and mail/wire fraud liability, see United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), aff’d after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.
1983) (unpublished order); United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); United States v. Elliott, 711 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (discussed supra
at notes 101–03 and accompanying text; infra notes 208–14 and accompanying
text). For additional discussion of Newman and Willis, see infra note 137.
125
521 U.S. 642, 649–66 (1997).
126
See United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 617–19 (8th Cir. 1995), rev’d,
521 U.S. 642 (1997); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944–49 (4th Cir. 1995);
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §5.4.1 nn.584–97, 606 and accompanying
text.
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tion with the purchase or sale of any security” as required by Exchange Act Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5127 because the misconduct has too tenuous a link with a securities transaction;128 (3)
more generally, an overly broad prohibition of insider trading may
frustrate “the need to allow persons to profit from generating information about firms so that the pricing of securities is efficient.”129
127

For discussion of the “in connection with” requirement under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 4.5, 6.13.
128
See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 949-50, 959. See also id. at 943–59 (rejecting the
Rule 10b-5 misappropriation theory). For discussion of Bryan, see WANG &
STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 4.5.2[A], 5.4.1[A].
The Eighth Circuit followed Bryan and rejected the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation
theory, in part because of the “in connection with” requirement. See United States
v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 619–20 (8th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 642, 649–66
(1997).
In their dissenting opinion in O’Hagan, Justice Thomas and Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the conduct encompassed by the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine does not meet the “in connection with” requirement. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 680–92 (Thomas, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
For discussion of whether the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation theory satisfies Section 10(b)’s “in connection with” requirement, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra
note 1, § 4.5.2.
For discussion of theoretical problems with the misappropriation doctrine under
Rule 10b-5, see William K.S. Wang, Post-Chiarella Developments in Rule 10b-5,
15 REV. SEC. REG. 956, 959–61 (1982).
In O’Hagan, the Supreme Court majority rejected the argument that the defendant
misappropriator’s misconduct had too tenuous a link with a securities transaction.
See 521 U.S. at 655–66. For discussion of this part of O’Hagan, see WANG &
STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4.5.2[B]. For additional discussion of O’Hagan, see
id. §§ 5.4 & nn.550–53, 5.4.1[B].
129
See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 581 (2d. Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(Winter, J., dissenting). Cf. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983) (“Imposing a
duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material
nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting
influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.”); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note
1, § 5.2.3[F] n.317 and accompanying text (discussing this language in Dirks).
For related discussion, see id. § 2.2.2.
For discussion of possible special Rule 10b-5 insider trading solicitude for analysts, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 5.2.3[C][2] n.168, 5.2.3[F] n.317
and accompanying text; Dreeben, supra note 83, at 211–12. See also Chestman,
947 F.2d at 581 (Winter, J., dissenting) (quoted supra in text at this note). For
discussion of a possible enhanced Rule 10b-5 insider trading obligation for broker-dealers, see id. § 5.2.3[F].
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If one rejects these arguments, Judge Winter may sometimes be
incorrect in concluding that, in insider trading cases, a Rule 10b-5
violation is harder to prove than mail fraud. In certain instances, a
breach of a fiduciary or “fiduciary-like” duty to an information
source (Rule 10b-5 misappropriation) may be easier (rather than
harder) to find than a deprivation of “property” under mail and wire
fraud. For example, when someone breaches the confidence of a relative, as alleged in Chestman, a breach of duty to the information
source might seem a more plausible theory than one based on loss
of “property.”130
In any event, other judicial opinions appear to support Judge
Winter’s conclusion that, with inside trading criminal cases, Rule
10b-5 misappropriation is more difficult to prove than mail and wire
fraud. In Carpenter itself, the Supreme Court split evenly on the
Rule 10b-5 misappropriation convictions, but unanimously upheld
the mail/wire fraud convictions based on the deprivation of confidential information-property.131 Further, in their concurring and dissenting opinion in O’Hagan, Justice Thomas and Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that they would reverse O’Hagan’s convictions under Rule 10b-5 (because of a rejection of the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine), but in effect sustain O’Hagan’s mail fraud convictions.132 Justice Thomas (and Chief Justice Rehnquist) commented:
While the majority may find it strange that the “mail
fraud net” is broader reaching than the securities
fraud net, any such supposed strangeness—and the
resulting allocation of prosecutorial responsibility
130

Nevertheless, the court in United States v. Reed treated Rule 10b-5 misappropriation and wire fraud as equivalent and refused to dismiss indictments
against a son for trading on material nonpublic information misappropriated from
his father. See 601 F. Supp. 685, 695–720 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d on other
grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1983). Reed is overshadowed and limited by
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569–70 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc). For
discussion of Chestman overshadowing and limiting Reed, see WANG &
STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.3[E], at 448–49. At least partly in reaction to
Chestman, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-2 (discussed supra in note 116).
131
See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). For discussion of Carpenter, see supra notes 58–83 and accompanying text.
132
See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 680–701 (Thomas, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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between the Commission and the various United
States Attorneys—is no business of this Court, and
can be adequately addressed by Congress if it too
perceives a problem regarding jurisdictional boundaries among the Nation’s prosecutors.133

133

Id. at 701 n.13.
Invoking the rule of lenity, Justice Scalia, with almost no discussion, said that he
also would reverse the Rule 10b-5 convictions but in effect affirm the mail fraud
convictions. See id. at 679 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
For additional discussion of these two concurring and dissenting opinions and
their concurrence with the majority’s remand for consideration of defendant arguments not considered by the Eighth Circuit, see supra note 93. For discussion
of the majority’s mail fraud holding in O’Hagan, see supra notes 84–96. For discussion of the rule of lenity (strict construction of criminal statutes in favor of the
defendant), see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4.5.2[B] n. 495.
The O’Hagan majority did not indicate whether securities fraud is narrower or
broader than mail/wire fraud. See 521 U.S. at 677–78. Nevertheless, the majority
did reaffirm: “Just as in Carpenter, so here, the ‘mail fraud charges are independent of [the] securities fraud charges, even [though] both rest on the same set of
facts.’” 521 U.S. at 678 (bracketed material in original) (quoting Brief for United
States 46-47). For earlier discussion of this portion of O’Hagan, see supra note
96 and accompanying text. For a longer quotation including this language, see
infra text accompanying note 137.
Two Fourth Circuit cases affirmed the convictions of insider trading defendants
under mail and/or wire fraud, while reversing their convictions under Rule 10b-5
(because of a rejection of the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine). See United
States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 965–67 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bryan,
58 F.3d 933, 943–59 (4th Cir. 1995). Bryan expressed a lack of concern for the
consequences of its rejection of the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine because
much of the conduct covered by that doctrine is also covered by the Rule 10b-5
classical relationship theory or mail/wire fraud. See 58 F.3d at 953. ReBrook relied
both on Carpenter (dividing evenly on Rule 10b-5 misappropriation; yet upholding the mail/wire fraud convictions based on deprivation of information-property)
and “holdings of various courts that there is no multiplicity issue when prosecuting the same purchase or sale of securities under both the securities fraud statute
and the wire fraud statute.” ReBrook, 58 F.3d at 967.
These two Fourth Circuit opinions, however, relied on the 1988 Congressional
amendment extending mail/wire fraud to the “the deprivation of the intangible
right to honest services.” See Rebrook, 58 F.3d at 966; Bryan, 58 F.3d at 939–43.
The two decisions predate Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010), which
held that the 1988 amendment covers only bribery and kickback schemes. For
discussion of the 1988 amendment, see supra note 71 and accompanying text. For
discussion of Skilling, see supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.

258

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:220

For discussion of cases, including Carpenter, that seem willing to expand
mail/wire fraud beyond securities fraud, see Dreeben, supra note 83, at 189–91,
199–214.
Pre-Skilling, two commentators suggested that mail/wire fraud is more expansive
than federal securities law:
But in the other major area of securities law violations, insider
trading and “misappropriation,” we again, as under § 1346, encounter struggles to define fiduciary duty and to find identifiable victims of obviously bad actors. Put simply, securities fraud,
as embodied by § 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and by Rule 10b-5, requires a “fraud,” and the question to explore then is whether securities fraud has come to conceive victim-hood as broadly and amorphously as mail fraud.
Mills & Weisberg, supra note 21, at 1425.
Similarly, the same article noted:
One subsidiary effect of the expansion of mail fraud law has
been to reconfirm that it can do the work of securities fraud by
treating insider trading cases as instances of theft. Under mail
and wire fraud law, we have a progressively vaguer standard
and a greater reach of inchoate crime doctrine . . . . Section 1348
[§ 807 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, adding 18 U.S.C.
§ 1348, a new crime of “securities fraud”] . . . might suggest a
way for prosecutors to use mail and wire fraud even more expansively as a substitute for SEC laws . . . .The new law might,
in effect, moot the need for the government to use the insider
trading or misappropriation doctrines . . . .
Id. at 1437–38. For discussion of § 1348, see supra note 21.
For additional pre-Skilling commentary arguing that, with respect to insider trading, mail/wire fraud may have a broader application than Rule 10b-5 misappropriation, see Stephen H. Case & Jimmy H. Morales, Landmark Cases and Concepts in the Law of “Insider” or “Breach of Duty” Trading Under Federal Securities, Mail and Wire Fraud Laws: A Primer for Working and Chapter 11 Lawyers, C647 ALI-ABA 163, 173 (Sept. 28, 1991) ( “[C]riminal insider trading
charges [under] . . . mail and wire fraud are easier to prove.”); Humke, supra note
43, at 842–44.
One treatise said:
The mail and wire fraud statutes do not specify who needs to be
defrauded. They thereby neatly avoid the Chiarella requirement
of fiduciary duty to the opposite party to the securities trade.
And they neatly achieve the objective of misrepresentation the-
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ory to find violation when MNPI [material non-public information] is taken from someone unrelated to the opposite party
or to the issuer of the security.
3 BROMBERG, LOWENFELS, & SULLIVAN, supra note 13, § 6:372, at 6-1009.
Computer hacking may sometimes escape liability under either mail/wire fraud or
Rule 10b-5 misappropriation, but may possibly be more likely to escape liability
under Rule 10b-5. SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), rev’d,
574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009), involved a defendant who traded on material nonpublic information obtained through computer hacking. The court stated:
Based on the evidence provided at the November 28, 2007 hearing there would appear to be sufficient basis to conclude that
Dorozhko’s hack violated the . . . mail fraud statute . . . and the
wire fraud statute . . . .However, since the SEC has apparently
declined, for whatever reason, to involve the criminal authorities in this case, we must address an inconvenient truth about
our securities laws . . . .Upon a searching review of existing case
law, and for the reasons that follow, we believe that we are constrained to hold that Dorozhko’s alleged ‘stealing and trading’
or ‘hacking and trading’ does not amount to a violation of
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 because Dorozhko did not breach any
fiduciary or similar duty “in connection with” the purchase or
sale of a security.
Id. at 324.
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit reversed and held that breach of fiduciary
duty was not a prerequisite to Rule 10b-5 “deceit” and that, depending on the
facts, the defendant’s hacking might (or might not) involve the “deceit” required
for Rule 10b-5. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 46–51 (2d Cir. 2009).
When discussing the issue whether computer hackers are Rule 10b-5 misappropriators, one article said: “Under the traditional view, they would have to be punished for their misdeeds via mail fraud, wire fraud, simple theft, or other comparable statutes.” Robert A. Prentice, The Internet and Its Challenges for the Future
of Insider Trading Regulation, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH 263, 298 (1999).
In at least one respect, mail/wire fraud is broader than SEC Rule 10b-5. The latter
covers only conduct “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a security. See
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4.5. For related discussion, see supra notes
126-27 and accompanying text. Mail/wire fraud is not so limited. See MARVIN G.
PICKHOLZ, PETER J. HENNING & JASON R. PICKHOLZ, 21 SECURITIES CRIMES
§ 6:29 (2014); Case & Morales, supra, at 173; Ted Kamman & Roy T. Hood, With
the Spotlight on the Financial Crisis, Regulatory Loopholes, and Hedge Funds,
How Should Hedge Funds Comply with the Insider Trading Laws?, 2009 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 357, 393–97 (application of mail/wire fraud to insider trading in
non-securities-based swap agreements). For a general discussion of the federal
regulation of insider trading in derivatives, see Yesha Yadav, Insider Trading in
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Derivatives Markets, 103 GEO. L.J. 381, 407–09 (2015) (discussing SEC and
CFTC regulations).
For an argument for increased regulation of insider trading in the commodities
markets, see Andrew Verstein, Insider Trading in Commodities Markets, 101 VA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). Normally, commodities are not securities under the
federal securities laws. See 7 HAZEN, supra note 18, § 1.6[6] (“Commodities
themselves and commodities futures are not securities.”). For examples of cases
applying mail/wire fraud to commodities or commodities futures transactions, see
United States v. Sleight, 808 F.2d 1012, 1014 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying mail fraud
to cocoa futures); United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 164 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying mail and wire fraud to silver futures). For related discussion, see infra notes
142–43 and accompanying text. See generally Gretchen Morgenson, Vague
Words That Imperil Investors, NY TIMES, Aug. 23, 2015, Sunday Business, at 1,
5 (“Prohibitions against insider trading apply only to securities . . . .Investors taking the view that leveraged loans are not securities have contended that their trading on such information is not bound by these rules.”).
As mentioned earlier, section 807 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes
criminal penalties for: “[w]hoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a
scheme or artifice—(1) to defraud any person in connection with . . . any security
of an issuer with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (emphasis added). For the conclusion that section 807’s “in connection with” language is broader than Section
10(b)’s “in connection with the purchase or sale,” see Mills & Weisberg, supra
note 21, at 1425. For additional discussion of section 807, see supra note 21.
This Article discusses criminal liability. When bringing Rule 10b-5 civil actions
against insider trading defendants, the SEC has a laxer burden of proof, and the
culpability requirement of the defendant may be lower than in a criminal proceeding. See Outlook 2015: Securities Litigation and Enforcement, 27 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 129 (Jan. 29, 2015).
For discussion of the intent requirement for mail/wire fraud, see supra notes 19–
20 and accompanying text. For discussion of the Rule 10b-5 scienter requirement
and its application to insider trading defendants, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra
note 1, § 4.4. For discussion of the special features of the Rule 10b-5 scienter of
tippers and tippees, see id. § 4.4.5. For discussion of the Rule 10b-5 “personal
benefit” requirement for initial tipper liability, see infra notes 216, 220–29 and
accompanying text. For discussion of the Rule 10b-5 “know or should know of
initial tipper’s violation” requirement for tippee liability, see infra notes 217–19
and accompanying text. For discussion of the sometimes blurry distinction between the scienter and “personal benefit” requirements, see infra notes 226–30
and accompanying text.
Just as mail/wire fraud overlaps somewhat with Exchange Act § 10(b) and SEC
Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court has held that Exchange Act § 10(b) and SEC Rule
10b-5 overlap with more specific anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities
laws. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381–87 (1983)
(unanimous decision) (recognizing overlap with express private remedy of Securities Act of 1933 § 11); SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468–69 (1969)
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Nevertheless, other judicial opinions seem to support the alternative conclusion that Rule 10b-5 misappropriation and mail/wire
fraud are equally difficult to demonstrate. The majority opinion in
O’Hagan analogized mail/wire fraud to the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation theory and cited the mail/wire fraud decision of Carpenter
as precedent for the validity of the misappropriation doctrine.134 The
Court noted:
Carpenter’s discussion of the fraudulent misuse of
confidential information, the Government notes, “is
a particularly apt source of guidance here, because
[the mail fraud statute] (like Section 10(b)) has long
been held to require deception, not merely the breach
of a fiduciary duty.”135
Furthermore, the majority opinion in O’Hagan spent only a few
sentences to affirm (in effect) the mail fraud convictions136 and commented:
Just as in Carpenter so here, the “mail fraud charges
are independent of [the] securities fraud charges,
even [though] both rest on the same set of facts.”
Brief for United States 46–47. We need not linger
over this matter, for our rulings on the securities
fraud issues [in effect affirming convictions under
the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation theory] require that
we reverse the Court of Appeals judgment on the
mail fraud counts as well.”137
(recognizing overlap with Exchange Act § 14 and stating “The fact that there may
well be some overlap is neither unusual nor unfortunate.”).
134
See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654.
135
Id. (quoting Brief for United States at 18, n.9 (citation omitted)).
136
See id. at 677–78.
137
Id. at 678. (Technically, the Court remanded to the Eighth Circuit for consideration of O’Hagan’s objections to his Rule 10b-5 and mail fraud convictions
not considered by the Eighth Circuit. See id. at 666, 677-78.) At least on the facts
of that case, the Court viewed Rule 10b-5 misappropriation as equivalent to
mail/wire fraud. For discussion of the Rule 10b-5 portion of O’Hagan, see WANG
& STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 4.4.5, 4.5.2[B], 5.4 & nn.550–53, 5.4.1[B].
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit opinion reversed by the Supreme Court in O’Hagan
spent only one paragraph reversing his mail fraud convictions after reversing his
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Rule 10b-5 convictions. See United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 627–28 (8th
Cir. 1995), rev’d, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). The Eighth Circuit did acknowledge, however: “The mere fact that O’Hagan’s securities convictions are reversed does not
as a matter of law require that the mail fraud convictions likewise be reversed.”
Id. at 627. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit affirmed O’Hagan’s convictions on the mail fraud and other counts. See United States v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 645 (8th Cir. 1998).
The insider trading portion of United States v. Royer discussed wire fraud and
Rule 10b-5 misappropriation convictions jointly and affirmed them. See 549 F.3d
886, 897–99 (2d Cir. 2008).
In a Rule 10b-5 misappropriation case, SEC v. Rocklage, the defendant disclosed
to her information-source, her husband, her intent to convey material nonpublic
information to her brother shortly before she actually did so. See 470 F.3d 1, 3
(1st Cir. 2006). In the course of affirming the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s
motion to dismiss, the circuit court relied on the Supreme Court’s discussion of
mail/wire fraud in Carpenter: “In related areas of the law [mail/wire fraud], it is
well accepted that a scheme can be deceptive or fraudulent even if not all parts of
the scheme are deceptive or fraudulent.” Id. at 13. For discussion of Rocklage and
Rule 10b-5 “brazen misappropriation,” see FERRARA, NAGY, & THOMAS, supra
note 21, § 2.02[6][iii]; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.1[B] & nn.613–
14.
In about two and a half pages, the court in United States v. Ruggiero affirmed the
securities and wire fraud convictions of an insider trading defendant. See 56 F.3d
647, 653–56 (5th Cir. 1995). The two-paragraph wire fraud discussion was based
on the court’s conclusion about securities fraud. See id. at 656. For additional
discussion of Ruggiero, see infra notes 167–76, 253–56 and accompanying text.
In United States v. Kim, the government accused the defendant of insider trading
and charged him with one count of wire fraud, two counts of securities fraud, and
one count of making a false statement. See 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1008–09 (N.D.
Cal. 2002). The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss both the securities
fraud counts and the wire fraud count. See id. at 1009, 1015. The opinion spent
almost seven pages discussing whether to dismiss the securities fraud count based
on the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation theory. See id. at 1009–15. After dismissing
the securities fraud counts, the judge dismissed the wire fraud count in just a few
sentences:
The alleged fraud underlying the securities fraud charges also
serves as the basis for the wire fraud charge. As the government
concedes, a wire fraud conviction must be based on a breach of
an underlying duty. For the reasons stated above no such duty
is present here. Accordingly, the indictment also fails to allege
a wire fraud violation.
Id. at 1015.
For discussion of the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation portion of Kim, see WANG &
STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.3[J].
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In SEC v. Zandford, the district court had entered summary judgment against the
defendant under Rule 10b-5 based on his criminal conviction for wire fraud. See
535 U.S. 813, 816 (2002). The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s dismissal of the complaint, but did not reach the issue of whether to affirm the summary judgment. See id. at 818.
United States v. Eisenberg, 773 F. Supp. 662, 721 (D.N.J. 1991), stated:
Because mail and wire fraud violations are premised on use of
the mails and wires to execute a scheme to defraud, the parties
appear to be correct in their contention that the most important
question is whether the Defendants’ conduct constituted fraud
within the meaning of the securities laws.
Although overshadowed and limited by Chestman v. United States, 947 F.2d 551,
569–70 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), the insider trading case of United States v. Reed,
601 F. Supp. 685, 695–720 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477
(2d Cir. 1983), treated Rule 10b-5 misappropriation and wire fraud as equivalent
when refusing to dismiss indictments. For discussion of Chestman’s overshadowing and limiting Reed, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.3[E], at 448–
49.
The majority in Chestman itself spent about five and a half pages on the reversal
of the defendant’s Rule 10b-5 misappropriation convictions. See Chestman, 947
F.2d at 566–71. The opinion then devoted only one paragraph on the reversal of
his mail fraud convictions. See id. at 571 (“The fortunes of Chestman’s mail fraud
convictions are tied closely to his securities fraud convictions.”).
The insider trading case of United States v. Newman spent about three and a half
pages refusing to dismiss the indictment for Rule 10b-5 misappropriation and
slightly over one page refusing to dismiss the mail fraud indictment. See 664 F.2d
12, 15–20 (2d Cir. 1981), aff’d after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1983) (unpublished order). Nevertheless, the court separately analyzed the two indictments.
See id.
Similarly, United States v. Willis, involved a psychiatrist who allegedly traded on
information from a patient. See 737 F. Supp. 259, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). The opinion spent about four and a quarter pages refusing to dismiss the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation counts and only about one page refusing the dismiss the mail fraud
counts. See id. at 271–76. Nevertheless, the court analyzed the two issues separately. See id.
Although noting the mail/wire fraud is not confined to “securities” and is in that
respect broader than SEC Rule 10b-5, two co-authors concluded: “since the mail
and wire fraud statutes require a misappropriation theory, they, like the insider
trading laws under Rule 10b-5, are limited by the constraints of this theory . . . .”
Kamman & Hood, supra note 133, at 396.
Similarly, another article states:
In practice, the interpretations of the mail and wire fraud statutes seem to follow the interpretation of Section
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2. THE PARTY ON THE OTHER SIDE AS VICTIM
Under SEC Rule 10b-5, a stock market insider trader has a duty
to disclose material information to the party on the other side of the
trade only when the two have a so-called “classical relationship.”138
This duty is breached by the material nondisclosure accompanying
the insider trade. For many reasons, the Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” theory may not be available. One possible example is a
corporate insider trading in the company’s debt instruments; it is unclear whether a “classical relationship” exists with the party on the
other side of the trade.139

10(b) . . . .Courts generally decide the merits of the 10b-5 [misappropriation] action; the mail and wire fraud counts are disposed of briefly, in the same fashion and with the same stated
rationale as the 10b-5 counts.
Ian Ayres & Joe Bankman, Substitutes for Insider Trading, 54 STAN. L. REV. 231,
260 (2001) (citing Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571).
Based on Carpenter, one treatise concludes “it seems clear that virtually all insider
trading cases will also be mail and wire fraud cases, whether under the misappropriation theory . . . .” 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING:
REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION § 8:14, at 8–49 (2014).
One commentator has claimed: “Congress must have had the mail-fraud statute in
mind when it drafted section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, [and] section 10(b) of the
1934 Act . . . .” Robert A. Prentice, Scheme Liability: Does It Have a Future After
Stoneridge?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 351, 384. See id. at. 365 n.77 (“Rule 10b-5’s
scheme to defraud language was copied from section 17(a) of the 1933
Act . . . .Congress derived that language, in turn, from the mail-fraud statute . . . .”); Strader, supra note 20, at 1455 (section 10(b) “was modeled on the
federal mail fraud statute”; footnote omitted).
Citing Prentice, the insider trading case of United States v. Whitman said: “Rule
10b–5 . . . was loosely modeled on the federal mail fraud statute . . . .” 904 F.
Supp. 2d 363, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555 F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014). For
related discussion of Whitman, see infra note 251 and accompanying text. Cf. SEC
v. Clark, 915 F.2d 915, 448 (9th Cir. 1990) (“For guidance in determining whether
the misappropriation theory fits within the concept of ‘fraud’ in § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, we look to the mail and wire fraud statutes, which contain similar language.”).
138
For discussion of the Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” theory, see United
States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 2014); WANG & STEINBERG, supra
note 1, §§ 5.2, 5.3.
139
See id. § 5.2.6[C]; Kamman & Hood, supra note 133, at 391–93.
Another illustration is the following: based on material nonpublic information
about her company, a corporate insider might trade other corporations’ stock, e.g.,

2015] MAIL, WIRE FRAUD STATUTES FOR INSIDER TRADING AND TIPPING

265

With stock market insider trading, an alternative to the Rule 10b5 “classical relationship” theory is Rule 10b-5 misappropriation.140
Of course, if the insider trade is in an item, not a “security” under
the federal securities laws,141 e.g., a commodity,142 then Rule 10b-5
does not apply.143
Somewhat similar to Rule 10b-5 misappropriation is mail/wire
fraud on the information-owner.144 Suppose, however, neither Rule
10b-5 misappropriation nor mail/wire fraud on the informationowner is applicable, perhaps because the information source/owner
gave permission to trade or tip,145 or possibly because the defendant
disclosed in advance to the information source/owner the plan to
shares of her company’s rivals, suppliers, customers, or the manufacturers of complementary products. For discussion of insider trading in such stock “substitutes”
(stock of a different issuer), see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.2.6[D];
Ayres & Bankman, supra note 137. For an empirical study of such trading, see
Mihir N. Mehta, David M. Reeb, & Wanli Zhao, Shadow Trading: Do Insiders
Exploit Private Information About Stakeholders? (forthcoming; available on
ssrn.com).
Sometimes, someone in the “classical relationship triangle” tips an outsider, and
the insider/tipper and/or the outsider/tippee is not liable. For discussion of “classical relationship” tipper/tippee liability, see infra Part II(B)(5); WANG &
STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 5.2.8, 5.3.
In the Supreme Court case that created the “classical relationship” theory, Chiarella v. United States, the defendant himself was not liable under the doctrine.
See 445 U.S. 222, 225–35 (1980); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.2.1.
140
For discussion of the SEC Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine, see
United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 445–46 (2d Cir. 2014); WANG &
STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4. For discussion of the overlap between the SEC
Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine and the Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship”
theory, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.11.
141
For discussion of the definition of “security” under the federal securities
laws, see 3 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF. SECURITIES AND
FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW 2D §§ 2:1–2:105 (2d ed. 2014); 2 BROMBERG,
LOWENFELS, & SULLIVAN, supra note 13, §§ 4.9-4.51; 7 HAZEN, supra note 18,
§ 1.6; 2 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN, & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES
REGULATION § 3(A)(1) (3d ed. 2014). For related discussion, see supra note 133.
142
See 7 HAZEN, supra note 18, § 1.6[6] (“Commodities themselves and commodities futures are not securities.”). For related discussion, see supra note 133.
143
For related discussion, see supra note 127 and accompanying text, 133.
144
See supra Part II(B)(1).
145
For discussion of why no Rule 10b-5 misappropriation occurs if the information source grants permission to trade or tip, see United States v. O’Hagan, 521
U.S. 642, 653–55, 659 n.9 (1997); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4
nn.551–53 and accompanying text.
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trade or tip.146 Also, assume that SEC Rule 14e-3 is not available
because the insider trading or tipping does not relate to an actual or
possible tender offer.147
In this situation, an alternative theory of mail/wire fraud liability
arises from the possible victim: the party on the other side of the
insider trade.148 The latter more closely resembles the classic fraud
victim, who is induced to buy or sell by a material misstatement or
nondisclosure. Mail and wire fraud can cover misstatements to
someone on the other side of a transaction.149 For nondisclosure to

146
For discussion of why Rule 10b-5 misappropriation might not occur if the
defendant discloses in advance to the information source the plan to trade or tip,
see O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653–55, 659 n.9; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1,
§ 5.4.1[B] nn.612–14 and accompanying text. But cf. SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d
1 (1st Cir. 2006) (discussed supra note 144 and in WANG & STEINBERG, supra
note 1, § 5.4.1[B] n.613). For additional discussion, see supra note 144.
Unclear is whether such advance disclosure would avoid mail/wire fraud liability
for misappropriation of confidential informational property. For related discussion, see supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
For discussion of loopholes in both the SEC Rule 10b-5 classical relationship and
misappropriation doctrines, see Kamman & Hood, supra note 133 at 376–400.
Computer hacking may sometimes escape liability under either theory. See supra
note140.
147
For discussion of SEC Rule 14e-3, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1,
ch. 9.
For discussion of its limitation to the tender offer context, see id. § 9.1.
148
For discussion of why the issuer should not be able to immunize its employees or independent contractors from Rule 10b-5 liability by granting permission for them to trade on material nonpublic information, see WANG &
STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.1[B] nn.613–22 and accompanying text.
For discussion of why advance disclosure to the issuer does not exonerate an insider from trading or tipping in violation of Rule 10b-5 under the “classical relationship” theory, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.1[B] nn.613–22
and accompanying text.
149
See, e.g., Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989) (involving used
car distributor who bought used cars, rolled back their odometers, and then sold
the cars to retail dealers); United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962) (to obtain
advance fees for company, officers, directors, and employees of a corporation
made lavish representations about the services company would provide; defendants did not intend to, and in fact did not make any substantial effort to perform
the promised services); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954) (applying the
mail fraud statute to defendants who duped a woman into advancing $35,000 toward a fictitious hotel deal); United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2000)
(materially misleading representations to potential investors); United States v. Lo-
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ayza, 107 F.3d 257, 267 (4th Cir. 1997) (affirming mail fraud convictions of defendants who devised a Ponzi scheme to induce individuals to invest). See also
United States v. Dinome, 86 F.3d 277, 283–84 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming conviction of defendant who deprived lender “of information [materially] relevant to its
decision whether it would extend him a loan”; facts involved affirmative misrepresentation); Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 71 F.3d 1343, 1346 (7th Cir. 1995)
(“all the [mail fraud] statute punishes is deliberate fraud . . . where in order to get
money or something else of monetizable value from someone you make a statement to him that you know to be false, or a half truth that you know to be misleading, expecting him to act upon it to your benefit and his detriment.”); 2
BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:48 nn.567, 571 and accompanying text.
For an opinion affirming the conviction of a defendant for aiding and abetting a
classic face to face wire fraud scheme involving duping two investors into making
a “guaranteed” investment in a company and then embezzling the funds invested,
see United States v. Pol-Flores, 644 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2011).
With reference to the mail fraud statute, one commentator noted: “Congress almost surely contemplated a classic fraud in which the victim is induced by false
representations to hand over money or tangible property to the defendant and the
victim’s loss is the defendant’s gain.” Bradley, supra note 83, at 594.
The language of both the mail and wire fraud statutes clearly covers “obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises . . . .” For the language of the mail and wire fraud statutes, see supra
notes 11, 12.
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that party to constitute mail and wire fraud, however, the defendant
must have a duty to disclose to the victim,150 although what creates
such a duty is not so clear.151
150
See United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1265 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We
have also held that a defendant’s non-action or non-disclosure of material facts
intended to create a false and fraudulent representation may constitute a violation
of the mail fraud statute where the defendant had a duty, explicit or implicit, to
disclose material information.”) (citing United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564,
571 (11th Cir. 1995)); Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1065
(11th Cir. 2007) (“‘[N]ondisclosure of material information can constitute a violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes where a defendant has a duty to disclose
either by statute or otherwise.’”) (quoting McCulloch v. PNC Bank Inc., 298 F.3d
1217, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002)); United States v. Skelly, 442 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir.
2006) (“[A] seller or middleman may be liable for [wire] fraud if he lies to the
purchaser or tells him misleading half-truths, but not if he simply fails to disclose
information that he is under no obligation to reveal.”); Kemp v. AT&T Co., 393
F.3d 1354, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Ayres v. Gen. Motors Corp., 234
F.3d 514 (11th Cir. 2000)); Ayres, 234 F.3d at 521 (although finding no mail or
wire fraud violations, stating “Plaintiffs rely primarily upon the theory that nondisclosure of material information can constitute a violation of the mail and wire
fraud statutes where a defendant has a duty to disclose. Ample case law supports
Plaintiffs’ legal theory.”); Bonilla v. Volvo Car Corp., 150 F.3d 62, 70–71 (1st
Cir. 1998) (“It would be a truly revolutionary change to make a criminal out of
every salesman (assuming use of the mails or telephone) who did not take the
initiative to reveal negative information about the product and who—a jury might
find—harbored in his heart the hope that the buyer would never ask.”); United
States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 664–67 (10th Cir. 1997) (reversing convictions
for nondisclosure because of lack of duty, although stating in passing dictum:
“Even apart from a fiduciary duty, in the context of certain transactions, ‘a misleading omission[ ] is actionable as fraud . . . if it is intended to induce a false
belief and resulting action to the advantage of the misleader and the disadvantage
of the misled.’”); id. at 665, quoting Emery, 71 F.3d at 1348; Reynolds v. E. Dyer
Dev. Co., 882 F.2d 1249, 1252–53 (7th Cir. 1989). United States v. Szur, 289 F.3d
200, 211 (2d Cir. 2002) (in the course of affirming convictions for wire fraud,
stated: “when dealing with a claim of fraud based on material omissions, it is
settled that a duty to disclose ‘arises [only] when one party has information that
the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation
of trust and confidence between them.’”) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 228 (1980)) (alterations in original). Nevertheless, Szur held that the
defendant securities brokers had a duty to disclose their “exorbitant” 45% or 50%
commissions “even in the absence of any general fiduciary duty resulting from
discretionary authority.” 289 F.3d at 212; Cf. Langford v. Rite Aid of Ala., Inc.,
231 F.3d 1308, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[C]oncealment of critical data, even
without a formalized duty to disclose that data, can constitute mail and/or wire
fraud in certain circumstances . . . . We can envision many situations in which a
failure to disclose information could constitute [mail/wire] fraud . . . even when
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no duty to disclose exists independently,” nevertheless, the court found no
mail/wire fraud duty to disclose under the circumstances of the case); United
States v. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 898–904 (4th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing between
simple nondisclosure and concealment in federal bank fraud case; finding the defendant guilty of concealment and therefore guilty of bank fraud); United States
v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 118 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating in dictum, “The fraud statutes are violated by affirmative misrepresentations or by omissions of material
information that the defendant has a duty to disclose.”); United States v. Morris,
80 F.3d 1151, 1161 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he statutes apply not only to false or
fraudulent representations, but also to the omission or concealment of material
information, even where no statute or regulation imposes a duty of disclosure.”);
United States v. Dowling, 739 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1984) (where nondisclosure was to third party copyright owners by defendant manufacturer and distributer of “bootleg” phonograph recordings, court stated “[N]on-disclosure can only
serve as a basis for a fraudulent scheme when there exists an independent duty
that has been breached by the person so charged.”; in that case, court held that
because nondisclosure violated an independent statutory duty, nondisclosure constituted mail fraud); see id. at 1449–50); United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920,
926 (2d Cir. 1981) (“the concealment by a fiduciary of material information which
he is under a duty to disclose to another under circumstances where the non-disclosure could or does result in harm to the other is a violation of the statute”)
(emphasis added); Odyssey Re (London) Ltd. v. Stirling Cooke Brown Holdings,
Ltd., 85 F. Supp. 2d 282, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“An omission cannot give rise to
a claim of mail or wire fraud liability absent a duty to disclose.”) (citations omitted).
151
See United States v. Mahaffy, 693 F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir. 2012) (not a
mail/wire fraud case; [T]he concealment by a fiduciary of material information
which he is under a duty to disclose to another under circumstances where the
non-disclosure could or does result in harm to another is a violation of [the fraud
statutes]’ . . . .Although this rule may not be ‘used in bootstrap fashion by finding
an obligation to disclose in every breach of fiduciary duty . . . .’”) (quoting mail
fraud opinion in United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 19 (2d Cir. 1981)), overruled on other grounds by McNally v. United States, 484 U.S. 350 (1987);
Sanchez v. Triple-S Mgmt. Corp., 492 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007) (“A defendant’s
failure to disclose information, without more, cannot make out a violation of the
mail and wire fraud statutes.”); id. at 10–11 (discussing, without concluding, the
issue whether “more” requires either (1) a duty to disclose or (2) just withholding
information with the intent to deceive), discussed in PAUL A. BATISTA, CIVIL
RICO PRACTICE MANUAL § 411E (3d ed. 2015)); United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d
227, 235–36 (4th Cir. 2005) (in affirming mail/wire fraud convictions, stating
“‘Even in the absence of a fiduciary, statutory, or other independent legal duty to
disclose material information, common-law fraud includes acts taken to conceal,
create a false impression, mislead, or otherwise deceive in order to prevent the
other party from acquiring material information.”) (quoting the federal bank fraud
case of United States v. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 898 (4th Cir. 2000)).
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One commentator has attempted the following summary of
when a mail/wire fraud duty to disclose exists:

Cf. United States v. Dowling, 739 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[N]on-disclosure can only serve as a basis for a fraudulent scheme when there exists an
independent duty that has been breached by the person so charged.”); for additional discussion, see supra note 150; Langford v. Rite Aid of Ala., Inc., 231 F.3d
1308, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2000) (vague standard quoted above in note 150).
For a district court’s application of Langford’s vague standard to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a civil RICO action based on the predicate
offenses of mail and wire fraud, see Bradley v. Franklin Collection Serv., No.
5:10-cv-01537-AKK, 2013 WL 1456714, at *6–7 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2013). For
a trial court decision applying Langford’s vague standard to dismiss a civil RICO
action based on the predicate offenses of mail and wire fraud, see Merkle v. Aetna
Health, Inc., No. 04-61713-CIV, 2006 WL 6151455, at *3–*4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 27,
2005). For an opinion applying Langford’s vague standard to refuse to dismiss a
private civil RICO class action based on mail and wire fraud as predicate offenses,
see In re Managed Care Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d, 1259, 1277–79 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
Quoting the First Circuit, the Tenth Circuit has stated:
A defendant’s failure to disclose information, without more, cannot make out a
violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes. The authorities are less uniform on
what “more” must be shown to transform a non-actionable nondisclosure into
fraud in this context. Some courts have required a duty to disclose, triggered by
an independent statutory scheme, the relationship between the parties, or the defendant’s partial or ambiguous statements that require further disclosure in order
to avoid being misleading, while others have held that withholding information
with the intent to deceive is enough.
United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1228–29 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Sanchez v. Triple-S Mgmt. Corp., 492 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007)). In Gallant, two
prospective buyers of bank stock (or their representatives) personally visited two
defendants and asked them questions about the bank and its operations. See id. at
1210–19. The defendants did not disclose certain problems. Id. Nor did they disclose the fact that they were opening bogus accounts and disguising delinquencies. See id. at 1216–17, 1229. The court held that the two defendants’ “conduct
went well beyond non-actionable non-disclosure and became ‘deceitful concealment of material facts,’ thus implicating [the defendants] in the wire fraud
scheme.” Id. at 1229 (quoting United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 665 (10th
Cir. 1997)).
In United States v. Brennan, one government allegation was that the defendant
violated the mail fraud statute in part because of nondisclosure of conflict of interest. See 183 F.3d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1999). Whether the defendant had a duty to
disclose under the mail fraud statute depended in part on whether the defendant
had a fiduciary duty to the alleged victims. See id. at 141, 149–50. The Second
Circuit questioned the accuracy of the trial court’s jury instruction attempting to
define the nature of fiduciary duties. See id. at 150–51.
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[M]ost courts recognize that in appropriate circumstances, a duty to disclose [under mail/wire fraud]
may be inferred from the relationship between the
parties. In jurisdictions that allow a less formal relationship to give rise to a duty, the determination as to
whether the duty exists is made on a case by case basis, taking into account both the nature of the transaction and the relationship between the parties.152
The 1940 Second Circuit decision of United States v. Buckner153
affirmed certain mail fraud and mail fraud conspiracy convictions
of defendants who participated in a scheme to profit from purchasing bonds based on nonpublic information.154 The two principal defendants were members of a bondholder’s protective committee.155
The court held that use of a position on the committee “to obtain
secret profits based upon inside information . . . [was] an active
[mail] fraud on the bondholders.”156 This language is not clear
whether “the bondholders” were mail fraud victims in their capacity
as indirect employers of the defendants or as prospective sellers to
the conspirators.
Nevertheless, the court noted: “[U]nlike the ordinary protective
committee, which purports to represent only those holders who have
made a deposit of their bonds, this committee asked for no deposit,
but assumed to represent the bondholders generally and the committee reported to them generally . . . .”157 This emphasis on a duty to
all bondholders suggests that the court may have viewed the victims
of the prospective insider trade as the bondholders who would sell
to the insider trader. Were the victim the employer (in this case, the

152

2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8.42, text accompanying nn.516.06 & 516.07
(footnotes omitted). For an additional brief discussion of when a duty to disclose
exists, see ANDROPHY, supra note 13, § 8:4
153
108 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1940).
154
See id. at 924–27, 930.
155
See id. at 923.
156
Id. at 926.
157
Id. at 927.
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committee and, indirectly, the bondholders represented by the committee), it would make no difference whether the committee represented some or all of the bondholders.158
A similarity exists between the Buckner defendants and corporate “insiders.” The Buckner defendants worked for a protective
committee that represented all the holders of a bond issue.159 Corporate “insiders,” such as directors, officers, independent contractors, and even lower-level employees, work for an issuing corporation for the benefit of all the shareholders. By analogy to Exchange
Act Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, such corporate insiders may
have a mail/wire fraud “special” or “classical” relationship with the
shareholders.160 Insiders who buy shares based on material nonpublic information may commit mail and wire fraud by breaching a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty to disclose to the shareholder in contractual privity.161 An insider who sells shares to someone not yet a
shareholder might still owe a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty to

158
For discussion of whether a creditor committee member has a Rule 10b-5
“classical relationship” with any represented creditor, see WANG & STEINBERG,
supra note 1, § 5.2.6[C] nn.375–76 and accompanying text. For discussion of the
more general issue of whether a corporate insider who trades the company’s debt
instruments has a Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” with the party on the other
side, see id. § 5.2.6[C]. For related discussion, see supra note 140 and accompanying text.
159
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
160
For a discussion of the “classical relationship” under Section 10(b)/Rule
10b-5 between employees/independent contractors of an issuer and the shareholders, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 5.2.3[A], 5.2.3[B].
161
Cf. United States v. Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 207, 211 (2d Cir. 2002) (in the
course of affirming convictions for wire fraud, stating: “when dealing with a claim
of fraud based on material omissions, it is settled that a duty to disclose ‘arises
[only] when one party has information that the other [party] is entitled to know
because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between
them.’” (quoting Rule 10b-5 classical relationship language of Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)) (alterations in original)) Nevertheless, Szur held
that the defendant securities brokers had a duty to disclose their “exorbitant” 45%
or 50% commissions “even in the absence of any general fiduciary duty resulting
from discretionary authority.” Szur, 289 F.3d at 212; United States v. DeCastris,
798 F.2d 261, 263 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Concealing information known to be pertinent
to a proper decision may be a fraudulent scheme [under mail fraud].”).
For discussion of the Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” duty to the
party on the other side of the trade, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.2.1
(discussing the “classical relationship” triangle).
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disclose to that prospective shareholder who becomes one simultaneous with the trade.162
Under the “special” or “classical” relationship mail/wire fraud
approach, the government should be able to prosecute for mail and
wire fraud even if the party in contractual privity with an insider
trader cannot be identified after the fact.163 The defendant must have
traded with someone; therefore a victim exists. Even if the party in
privity would have traded anyway,164 she can still be a victim of mail
and wire fraud: the party in privity is a victim of the nondisclosure,
not of the trade.165

162

For the Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 analogy, see Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (1980); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.2.1 n.49
and accompanying text.
163
Identifying the party in privity after the fact is sometimes possible and
sometimes not. See id. § 6.7 nn.485–96 and accompanying text. For related discussion, see infra note 197 and accompanying text.
United States v. Howard, 619 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2010), held: “We have previously determined, however, that this type of `fraud [mail and wire fraud] does
not include an element requiring a contemplated harm to a specific, identifiable
victim.’” (quoting United States v. Henningsen, 387 F.3d 585, 590 (7th Cir.
2004)).
Also quoting Henningsen, United States v. Munoz, 430 F.3d 1357, 1369 (11th
Cir. 2005), held: “‘The crime of mail fraud does not include an element requiring
a contemplated harm to a specific, identifiable victim.’”
164
See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 3.3.3.
165
For discussion of the distinction between trade victims and nondisclosure
victims, see id. § 3.2; William K.S. Wang, The Importance of “The Law of Conservation of Securities”: A Reply to John P. Anderson’s “What’s the Harm in
Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading?,” 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 812-13, 824
(2015). For extended discussion of trade victims, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra
note 1, § 3.3. For extended discussion of nondisclosure victims, see id. § 3.4, especially § 3.4.3[A].
Even were one to focus unnecessarily on the party on the other side as a trade
victim (as opposed to a nondisclosure victim), at least one circuit court has stated
that pecuniary loss to the victim is not necessary as long as pecuniary gain to the
defendant is present. See United States v. Blinder, 10 F.3d 1468, 1472–73 (9th
Cir. 1993). See also United States v. Akpan, 407 F.3d 360, 370 (5th Cir. 2005)
(defendant acts with the intent to defraud when he “acts knowingly with the specific intent to deceive for the purpose of causing pecuniary ‘loss to another or
bringing about some financial gain to himself.’”) (quoting United States v.
Blocker, 104 F.3d 720, 732 (5th Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added). Cf. United States
v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1399 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[W]e have been cited to no case,
and our research has discovered none, which has sustained a conviction for mail
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United States v. Ruggiero166 involved two insider trading defendants convicted of wire fraud and of securities fraud under SEC
Rules 10b-5167 and 14e-3.168 One defendant was a senior auditor employed at Vista Chemical Company.169 Allegedly, this defendant
gave a friend (the other defendant) material nonpublic information
about a takeover of Vista.170 Both defendants profited by buying
Vista call options prior to the takeover announcement.171
Applying a traditional Chiarella/Dirks analysis,172 the Fifth Circuit rejected the tippee’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
and affirmed his securities fraud convictions under the “classical relationship” theory under Exchange Act Section 10(b) and SEC Rule
10b-5.173 In only two sentences at the end of the opinion, the court
fraud on the basis of nothing more than the failure to mail a correct proxy solicitation where this was not in furtherance of some larger scheme contemplating
pecuniary loss to someone or pecuniary gain to those who designed it.”) (emphasis added). But cf. United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1996) (“the
government must show that some actual harm or injury was contemplated by the
schemer”) (quoting United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir.
1994)); United States v. Ruggiero, 56 F.3d 647, 656 (5th Cir. 1995) (“‘[t]he government must prove a specific intent to defraud, which requires a showing that the
defendant intended for some harm to result from his deceit.’”) (quoting United
States v. Loney, 959 F.3d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Another circuit case suggested that an intended victim may not be essential when
it approved a jury instruction stating “that intent to defraud could be found if the
defendants acted ‘knowingly with the specific intent to deceive ordinarily for the
purpose of causing some financial loss to another or bringing about some financial gain to oneself.’” United States v. Judd, 889 F.2d 1410, 1414 (5th Cir. 1989)
(quoting district court’s jury instruction on the mail and wire fraud charges) (alterations in original).
For discussion of the judicial division over whether the mail/wire fraud statutes
require a scheme that contemplates a loss to the victim, see 2 WELLING, BEALE,
& BUCY, supra note 15, § 17.8. For general discussion of the requisite intent to
defraud, see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
166
56 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 1995).
167
See id. at 649, 653–55. For discussion of the application of SEC Rule 10b5 to insider trading defendants, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, chs. 4, 5.
168
See Ruggiero, 56 F.3d at 649, 655. For discussion of SEC Rule 14e-3, see
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, ch. 9.
169
See Ruggiero, 56 F.3d at 649.
170
See id. at 649–51, 654–56.
171
See id. at 650.
172
See id. at 654–55. For discussion of the Chiarella and Dirks Supreme Court
decisions, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 5.2, 5.3.
173
See Ruggiero, 56 F.3d at 653–56.
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affirmed the same defendant’s wire fraud convictions: “As noted
above, we reject . . . the contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the securities law convictions. Accordingly, we
find that there was sufficient evidence that . . . [the defendant] used
the wires in furtherance of the fraud, thereby violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343.”174 Apparently, the Fifth Circuit imported the Rule 10b-5
classical relationship theory to wire fraud. Such a theory involves
fraud on the party on the other side of the insider trade.175
Uncertain is whether, for stock market insider traders, the required mail/wire fraud relationship is narrower, broader, or the same
as the necessary Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship.” Thus far, virtually no courts have explored the insider trader’s mail/wire fraud duty
to disclose to the party on the other side of the trade.
3. CAN AN INSIDER TRADER HAVE TWO MAIL/WIRE FRAUD
VICTIMS: THE ISSUER/INFORMATION-OWNER AND THE PARTY
ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE TRANSACTION?
Suppose an employee of a public company trades its shares
based on material nonpublic information. Does the insider trade
have two mail/wire fraud victims: the issuer/information-owner and
the party on the other side of the transaction?
Because the Carpenter defendants committed mail/wire fraud
by misappropriating the Wall Street Journal’s confidential informational property176 and because O’Hagan perpetrated mail fraud by
misappropriating informational property from his law firm and its
client,177 the hypothetical corporate employee might misappropriate
her employer’s confidential informational property. As discussed
above, another mail/wire fraud victim of the employee might be the

174

Id. at 656.
See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.2.1.
176
See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). For discussion of Carpenter, see supra notes 63–83 and accompanying text.
177
See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 678–79, 700–01 (1997) (applying Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19); United States v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 651–53
(8th Cir. 1998) (citing Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19). For discussion of both the Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit (on remand) O’Hagan opinions, see supra notes
84–97 and accompanying text.
175
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party on the other side of the trade.178 The courts have not considered whether the same conduct could have two separate mail/wire
fraud victims under two different theories.179
4. MATERIALITY
In Neder v. United States,180 the Supreme Court imposed a materiality requirement for mail/wire fraud.181 Neder said “a false statement is material if it has ‘a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to
which it was addressed.’”182 Additionally, while discussing the defendant’s argument that Congress implicitly incorporated the common law definition of materiality into the mail/wire fraud statutes,
the Court included a footnote quoting the Restatement (Second) of
Torts’ definition of a material matter:
(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its
existence or nonexistence in determining his choice
of action in the transaction in question; or (b) the
maker of the representation knows or has reason to
know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard
the matter as important in determining his choice of
178

See supra Part II(B)(2).
For discussion of the related question whether an employee trading her
company’s stock based on material nonpublic information can violate both the
SEC Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine and the “classical relationship” theory,
see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.11.
Were such Rule 10b-5 overlap permitted, and were the tests for tipper/tippee liability laxer for Rule 10b-5 misappropriation than for the Rule 10b-5 “classical
relationship,” prosecutors, the SEC, and private plaintiffs might prefer pursuing
tippers and tippees under misappropriation rather than the “classical relationship.”
For discussion of the Rule 10b-5 liability of tippers and tippees under both theories, see infra Part II(B)(5); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 5.3, 5.4.4–
5.4.10. The Supreme Court has not addressed tipper and tippee liability under the
Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine.
180
527 U.S. 1 (1999).
181
See id. at 20–25; id. at 25 (“materiality of falsehood is an element of the
federal mail fraud, wire fraud . . . statutes”). For discussion of Neder, see 2
BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:48; Cloud & Shepherd, supra note 56, at 948.
182
Neder, 527 U.S. at 16 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509
(1995)).
Generally, a jury decides the question of materiality. See United States v. Harms,
442 F.3d 367, 373 (5th Cir. 2006).
179
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action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it.183
Restatement Section 538(2)(a) goes beyond the “reasonable person” standard.184 Nevertheless, some circuits may endorse the “reasonable person” or “person of ordinary prudence” definition:
mail/wire fraud is material only if a “reasonable person” would attach importance to the misstatement or nondisclosure.185 Other cir-

183

Neder, 527 U.S. at 22 n.5 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 538 (AM . LAW INST. 1977)).
184
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538, clause 2, (a) cmt. includes the
following statement:
Even though the matter misrepresented is one to which a reasonable man would not attach any importance in determining
his course of action in the transaction in hand, it is nevertheless
material if the maker knows that the recipient, because of his
own peculiarities, is likely to attach importance to it. There are
many persons whose judgment, even in important transactions,
is likely to be determined by considerations that the normal man
would regard as altogether trivial or even ridiculous. One who
practices upon another’s known idiosyncracies cannot complain if he is held liable when he is successful in what he is
endeavoring to accomplish.
See also Cloud & Shepherd, supra note 56, at 948 “([A] lie not capable of misleading a reasonable person is still material if a victim is so gullible, guileless, or
incompetent that he actually believes it.”).
185
See, e.g., United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 415–16 (6th Cir. 2005).
Accord 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:58 n.729.115–729.120 and accompanying
text; 2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 14, § 17.7(B), at 13–15; Lauren D.
Lunsford, Note, Fraud, Fools, and Phishing: Mail Fraud and the Person of Ordinary Prudence in the Internet Age, 99 KY. L.J. 379, 389–91 (2010-2011). Cf.
Linden v. United States, 254 F.2d 560, 566 (4th Cir. 1958) (while affirming convictions, quoting district court’s holding that “the defendants had engaged in ‘a
scheme reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension.’”); United States v. Hawkey, 148 F.2d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 1998) (preNeder; affirming convictions; in passing, saying scheme must be “‘reasonably
calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension.’”) (quoting United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1985)). But cf. United
States v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1168 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“[The defendants] cite decisions that use the ‘ordinary prudence’ language as evidence that
fraud requires a scheme capable of defrauding the reasonably prudent, but none
of the decisions cited by [the defendants] . . . overturned a conviction on the
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cuits have abandoned the “reasonable person” standard of materiality in favor of the broader formulation: capable of influencing the
intended victim.
In United States v. Brown, the Eleventh Circuit held: “mail fraud
requires the government to prove that a reasonable person would
have acted on the representations.”186 In 2009, however, in United
States v. Svete,187 the Eleventh Circuit en banc overruled Brown188
and held:
[P]roof of objective reliability is not necessary to establish materiality if the defendant knows or should
know that the victim is likely to regard the misrepresented facts as important . . . . [A] defendant who intends to deceive the ignorant or gullible by preying
on their infirmities is no less guilty.189
Citing other circuits that rejected Brown, Syete noted: “Brown
still stands alone. It has been rejected by other circuits. It has been
distinguished on debatable grounds within our Circuit. It has been
criticized in legal scholarship.”190
ground that the scheme was incapable of deceiving persons of ordinary prudence.”); United States v. Heppner, 519 F.3d 744, 749 (8th Cir. 2008) (“‘if it has
a natural tendency to influence or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the
decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.’”) (quoting Preston v. United
States, 312 F.3d 959, 961 n.3 (8th Cir. 2002)) (alteration in original); United
States v. McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Neder, 527 U.S.
at 16) (“material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed.”);
United States v. Hively, 437 F.3d 752, 764 (8th Cir. 2006) (“A misrepresentation
is material if it is capable of influencing the intended victim.” (citing Neder, 527
U.S. at 24)); Mark Zingale, Note, Fashioning a Victim Standard in Mail and Wire
Fraud: Ordinarily Prudent Person or Monumentally Credulous Gull?, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 795, 807 (1999) (“The circuits that use the objective [reasonable
person] standard usually invoke it while affirming the lower courts’ convictions);
id. at 807–08 (concluding that Linden v. United States in fact “extended the statute’s protection, which it saw as purposely broad, beyond the ordinarily prudent
person in order to reach those victims who were less than ordinarily prudent.
186
79 F.2d 1550. 1557 (11th Cir. 1996).
187
556 F.3d 117 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
188
See id. at 1166–70.
189
Id. at 1165.
190
Id. at 1167. For discussion of Svete, see 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, §§ 8:32,
8:58.

2015] MAIL, WIRE FRAUD STATUTES FOR INSIDER TRADING AND TIPPING

279

Likewise, in the Seventh Circuit decision, United States v. Coffman, Chief Justice Posner rejected Brown in ringing terms in interpreting the materiality requirement for mail/wire fraud:
But it is hard to believe that this language is intended
to be understood literally, for if it were it would invite con men to prey on people of below-average
judgment or intelligence, who are anyway the biggest targets of such criminals and hence the people
most needful of the law’s protection-and most needful or not are within its protective scope.191
191

Id. at 334.
For an example of another circuit that rejected Brown, see United States v. Amico,
486 F.3d 764, 780 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The majority of circuits to address the issue
have rejected [Brown].”). Earlier, the Second Circuit had decided United States v.
Thomas, 377 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2004), a case involving not mail/wire fraud but
inducement of travel in interstate commerce for a fraudulent purpose in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. Thomas noted: “Most circuits . . . have already rejected some
form of the `unreasonable victim’ [defense] argument.” Id. at 243. In Amico, 486
F.3d at 780, the Second Circuit extended its Thomas reasoning to mail fraud.
For other decisions rejecting the “reasonable person” standard, see United States
v. Hanley, 190 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Lemon v. United States,
278 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1960)); United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of
Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d
299 (1st Cir. 1980)) (defendant does not escape liability if victim was unwary or
even gullible; citing Brien); Brien, 617 F.2d at 311 (“[I]t makes no difference
whether the persons the schemers intended to defraud are gullible or skeptical,
dull or bright.”). See ANDROPHY, supra note 13, § 8:7; 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11,
§ 8:48 n.870.200 and accompanying text (“a statement may be material whether
or not anyone relies on it or even if the recipient knew of should have known it
was false”); id. § 8:58 n.726. See also id. § 8:58 n.729.130 and accompanying
text.
The court in United States v. Masten said that while the reasonable person standard might be useful in deciding whether the defendant had intent to defraud (e.g.,
when the defendant claims she was joking), once the defendant has the requisite
intent, and dupes the victim, it makes no difference whether the victim was “reasonable.” 170 F.3d 790, 795–96 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A]s we explained in Coffman,
the mail fraud statute also protects unreasonable persons.”).
As just mentioned (see supra text at note 183), Neder said that one possible definition of materiality was: “a false statement is material if it has ‘a natural tendency
to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking
body to which it was addressed.’” 527 U.S. at 16 (quoting United States v.
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)) (emphasis added). For cases adopting similar
definitions of materiality, see United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1299
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In those circuits that have adopted the “capable of influencing
the intended victim” test, the materiality definition for mail/wire
fraud is laxer than the “reasonable person” materiality standard for
SEC Rule 10b-5.192

(11th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 1271 (11th Cir.
2003)) (“if it has ‘a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing
the decision maker to whom it is addressed.’”); United States v. Blixt, 548 F.3d
882, 888 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing inquiry as “‘[w]hether the statement has a
natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the addressee’s decision.’”) (quoting United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1182 (9th Cir. 2004));
United States v. Jackson, 546 F.3d 801, 815 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Neder, 527
U.S. at 16); United States v. Heppner, 519 F.3d 744, 749 (8th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 339 (5th Cir. 2008) (describing materiality as
“[having] a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed.’”) (quoting United
States v. Harms, 442 F.3d 367, 372 (5th Cir. 2006)); United States v. Rosby, 454
F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2006) (“A representation is material if it has a tendency to
influence the decision of the audience to which it is addressed.”) (citing Neder,
527 U.S. at 22–23); United States v. Hively, 437 F.3d 752, 764 (8th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888, 899 (10th Cir. 2005) (approving a jury
instruction that a statement is material if “‘it has a natural tendency to influence,
or is capable of influencing a decision or action by another.’”); United States v.
Henningsen, 387 F.3d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A false statement is material if
it has ‘a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision
of the decisionmaking body to which it is addressed.’”) (quoting United States v.
Fernandez, 282 F.3d 500, 508 (7th Cir. 2002)); United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d
1174, 1182–83, 1190 (9th Cir. 2004) (“whether the statement has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the addressee’s decision”) (citing
United States v. LeVeque, 283 F.3d 1098, 1103–1104 (9th Cir. 2002)).
For discussion of the split among the circuits and an argument against the “person
of ordinary prudence” standard, see Lunsford, supra note 186. For additional discussion of the split among the circuits, see 2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra
note 15, § 17.7(B); Zingale, supra note 186. Cf. Doyle Chapter, supra note 13, at
4 (discussing the issue “whether the statutes reach schemes designed to deceive
the gullible though they would not ensnare the reasonably prudent.”).
192
For discussion of the materiality standard for SEC Rule 10b-5, see Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (“‘[a]n omitted fact is material if there
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder [investor] would consider
it important in deciding how to vote [whether to buy or sell].’”) (quoting TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 462 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); id. at 231–32 (“‘there
must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total
mix’ of information made available.’”) (quoting TSC Industries, 462 U.S. at 449);
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4.2.
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A stock market trader may or may not know the identity of the
party on the other side. The line between face-to-face stock trades
and stock market transactions is blurry. Especially with large blocks,
such trading often involves conversations between buyer and
seller.193
When the insider trader does not know the identity of the person
on the opposite side, however, it may be difficult to apply the materiality standard: “capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.”194 With an anonymous
transaction, the courts might conceivably adapt this definition, with
a result potentially different from the Rule 10b-5 standard.195 For
example, one possible mail/wire fraud adaptation would be: capable
of influencing the decision of the typical investor or, alternatively, a
reasonable investor.
When the victim is the information-owner, mail/wire fraud materiality may have a different meaning than when the victim is the
party on the other side of a transaction.196
With respect to “materiality,” one commentator has said: “There is no assurance
that the mail fraud statute will be applied in a fashion consistent with Rule 10b-5.
Mail fraud does not traditionally deal with materiality concepts, nor, of course,
did Carpenter include a materiality test.” Dreeben, supra note 83, at 213. For
discussion of two mail/wire fraud cases, United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777 (2d
Cir. 1985) and United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1983), in which the
materiality definition was much broader than that under the federal securities
laws, see Dreeben, supra note 83, at 189–91.}}
193

See Dan Stumpf, Markets Keeping Faith in Humanity, WALL ST. J., July
29, 2014, at C1 (“Last year, about 55% of stock trading by dollar volume took
place in a ‘high-touch’ fashion, among human beings communicating one on one
and agreeing on the price.”).
For discussion of the blurred distinction between block trades and face-to-face
trading, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 3.3.1, 8.2.2, 15.2.1; William
K.S. Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading: Victims, Violators and Remedies–Including an Analogy to Fraud in the Sale of a Used Car with a Generic Defect, 45
VILLANOVA L. REV. 27, 30–31 (2000).
194
Neder, 527 U.S. at 16 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 509
(1995)). For additional discussion, see supra notes 183–85, 187–94 and accompanying text.
195
For discussion of the definition of “materiality” under Rule 10b-5, see supra note 192.
196
For a discussion of the definition of “materiality” under the Rule 10b-5
“misappropriation” doctrine of insider trading liability, see WANG & STEINBERG,
supra note 1, § 4.2.1.
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In Rule 10b-5 misappropriation cases, the courts have generally
defined materiality in terms of a reasonable investor’s decision to
purchase or sell.197 Arguably, however, the relevant standard of materiality in such cases should be the importance of the information
to the information-source.198 Similarly, in mail/wire fraud insider
trading cases based on the deprivation of confidential informational
property, arguably the relevant standard of materiality should be the
importance to the property owner.199
In its mail/wire fraud informational property decision, Carpenter, the Supreme Court did not mention materiality.200 Likewise,
while addressing insider trading in O’Hagan,201 the Supreme Court
did not discuss materiality either for Rule 10b-5 or mail fraud.202
Outside the insider trading context, prior to Skilling,203 the Second Circuit en banc adopted the following test for finding a deprivation of “the intangible right to honest services”: “the misrepresentation or omission at issue for an ‘honest services’ fraud conviction
must be ‘material,’ such that the misinformation or omission would

197

See id. § 4.2.1 n.44 and accompanying text.
See id. § 4.2.1 nn.39–42, 45 and accompanying text.
199
Cf. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 19 (2d Cir. 1981) (an insider
trading case quoting United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir.
1980) (“an employee’s breach of his fiduciary obligations is actionable under the
[mail fraud] statute when it encompasses the violation of a ‘duty to disclose material information to his employer.’”) (emphasis added)).
200
See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). For discussion of Carpenter, see supra Part II(B)(1).
201
521 U.S. 642 (1997).
202
See id. For discussion of O’Hagan, see supra notes 60–62, 84–96 and accompanying text.
On remand, the court in United States v. O’Hagan discussed materiality in the
Rule 10b-5 part of the opinion, but not in its mail fraud portion. See 139 F.3d 641,
648, 651–53 (8th Cir. 1998). For additional discussion of this decision, see supra
note 97 and accompanying text; infra notes 260–61 and accompanying text.
In United States v. Cherif, a mail/wire fraud stock market insider trading case, the
court held that the defendant had waived his argument that the trial court had
failed to instruct the jury that the information he obtained or sought to obtain was
“material.” See 943 F.2d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 1991).
203
The court in Skilling v. United States held that the “intangible right to honest services” applies only to bribery and kickback schemes. See 561 U.S. 358
(2010). For discussion of mail/wire fraud’s application to the deprivation of “the
intangible right to honest services,” see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
198
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naturally tend to lead or is capable of leading a reasonable employer
to change its conduct.”204
In United States v. Elliott,205 the defendant was an attorney who
allegedly engaged in wire fraud by insider trading on confidential
client information thereby depriving his law firm and its clients of
confidential informational property.206 The government conceded
204

United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis added). Rybicki discussed the then judicial split (pre-Skilling) over the
proper test for mail/wire fraud liability for “honest services fraud”: “reasonable
foreseeable harm” to the employer or “materiality” to the employer. See id. at
145–46.
For additional discussion of this pre-Skilling split, see United States v. Vinyard,
266 F.3d 320, 327–28 (4th Cir. 2001); 2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note
15, § 17.19(B); Anita Cava & Brian M. Stewart, Quid Pro Quo Corruption Is “So
Yesterday”: Restoring Honest Services Fraud After Skilling and Black, 12 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 1, 7–8 (2011); Andrew B. Matheson, A Critique of United States
v. Rybicki: Why Foreseeable Harm Should Be an Aspect of the Mens Rea of Honest Services Fraud, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 355, 370–86 (2004–05); Lisa Kern
Griffin, The Federal Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1815,
1842–43 (2011). For an example of a pre-Skilling Second Circuit “honest services” wire fraud opinion following Rybicki’s definition of materiality, see United
States v. Gotti, 459 F.2d 296, 330 (2d Cir. 2006). For a pre-Skilling district court
“honest services” case quoting Rybicki’s definition, see World Wrestling Entm’t,
Inc. v. Jakke Pac., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 2d 486, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
For another example of a pre-Skilling “honest services” case adopting the “materiality to employer” test, see United States v. Ballard, 663 F.2d 534, 541 (5th Cir.
1981) (materiality exists whenever an employee “has reason to believe that the
information would lead a reasonable employer to change its business conduct.”)
(emphasis added). See United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 519 (5th Cir. 2006)
(citing Ballard, 663 F.2d at 541); United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769, 774–75 (5th
Cir. 1996) (citing and quoting Ballard, 663 F.2d 534); United States v. Lemire,
720 F.2d 1327, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Ballard, 663 F.2d at 541); United
States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 763 (7th Cir. 1983) (“only if the nondisclosed
information was material to the conduct of the employer’s business”; honest services case”) (citing Ballard, 663 F.2d 534). For discussion of Feldman, see Bradley, supra note 83, at 597–99.
For pre-Skilling discussion of the materiality to employer requirement in “honest
services” cases, see 2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15, § 17.19(A)(ii).
For a post-Skilling circuit court decision adopting the “materiality to employer
test” in a bribery-based “deprivation of honest services” scheme, see United States
v. Milovanovic, 678 F.3d 713, 716, 726–28 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Gray, 96 F.3d
769; Rybyicki, 354 F.3d 124; and other circuit court cases).
205
711 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
206
See id. at 426–29. For additional discussion of Elliott, see supra notes 101–
03 and accompanying text.
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that the “‘nonpublic information must have been of some importance to both Elliott and the victims of the fraud to constitute
property.’”207 The fraud victims were the law firm and its clients.208
Nevertheless, the court in Elliott held that the indictment sufficiently alleged that the confidential client information was material
because the indictment stated that the defendant:
bought stock in companies he knew were targeted for
acquisition, in the expectation that the price of the
stock would rise when the acquisition became public.
If the price of the stock was expected to rise when
information about the acquisition became public, that
information must have had some significance or, to
use Elliott’s word, must have been “material.209
Just because the defendant expected the information to cause a
stock price increase when released does not necessarily mean that
the information was material to the law firm or its clients.210
Ironically, in its discussion of materiality under the Rule 10b-5
misappropriation doctrine, Elliott held that the proper definition was
the importance to the employer/information-source and not outside
investors:
In a misappropriation case, however, where the focus
is on the insider’s duty to the corporation, it would
be incongruous to have a materiality standard based
on the outsider’s point of view. Rather, we believe it
is enough if the misappropriated information is
“solely for corporate purposes,” Dirks, 464 U.S. at
207

Elliot, 711 F. Supp. at 430 (quoting Government’s Response at 9) (emphasis added).
208
See id. at 426–29.
209
Id. at 430.
210
Nevertheless, an insider trading case that apparently treated Rule 10b-5 and
mail fraud materiality as equivalent is United States v. Victor Teicher & Co., L.P.,
785 F. Supp. 1137, 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Similarly, in the course of refusing to dismiss an indictment for insider trading in
violation of both Rule 10b-5 and wire fraud, a trial court applied Levinson and the
Rule 10b-5 materiality definition in its three-paragraph discussion of materiality
under both Rule 10b-5 and wire fraud. See United States v. ReBrook, 837 F. Supp.
162, 169 (W.D. Va. 1993).
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655 . . . and if a reasonable corporate executive
would believe keeping that information confidential
was valuable to the corporation.211
In any event, for mail/wire fraud liability for stock market insider trading, materiality may have a standard that is:
(1) laxer (beyond “reasonable person”) or
(2) in cases involving deprivation of informational
property, different (importance to the owner of the
information as opposed to a stock market investor).
5. “PERSONAL BENEFIT” TEST FOR TIPPER LIABILITY AND
“KNOW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF INITIAL TIPPER’S
BREACH” TEST FOR TIPPEE LIABILITY
Under the Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” theory and probably the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine, the initial tipper must
receive a “personal benefit.”212 Under the Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” theory and probably the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation
doctrine, each direct and remote tippee must “know or should know”
of the initial tipper’s violation.213 With Rule 10b-5 misappropriation, however, the Supreme Court has not addressed the standard for
tipper and tippee liability.
211

711 F. Supp. at 433.
See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 446–47 (2d Cir. 2014) , cert.
denied, 2015 WL 4575840 (U.S., Oct. 5, 2015); id. at 446 (“The elements of tipping liability are the same regardless of whether the tipper’s duty arises under the
“classical” or the “misappropriation” theory.”) (citing SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276,
285–86 (2d Cir. 2012)); SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1274–80 (11th Cir. 2003)
(applying “personal benefit” test to misappropriating tipper); WANG &
STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 5.2.8, 5.4.4. For the Supreme Court’s “personal benefit” test for tipper liability in a Rule 10b-5 classical relationship case, see Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662–64 (1963); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.2.8.
For application of the Dirks test for tipper liability, see Newman, 773 F.3d at 446,
451–53 (discussed infra at notes 222–230 and accompanying text).
213
See SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 287–89 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating misappropriator’s tippee must “know or should know” of the initial tipper’s violation);
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 5.3.2, 5.4.5. For the Supreme Court’s
standard for tippee liability in a Rule 10b-5 classical relationship case, see Dirks,
463 U.S. at 660. For application of the Dirks test for tippee liability, see Newman,
773 F.3d at 446-50 (discussed infra at notes 227–35 and accompanying text.
212
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A recent Rule 10b-5 Second Circuit decision makes it more difficult for the prosecution to demonstrate the “personal benefit” and
“know or should know” elements.214 As to the requirement that the
tippee “know or should know” of the initial tipper’s violation, the
Second Circuit held that means that the tippee must know that the
initial tipper received the requisite “personal benefit.”215 The court
noted that, to its knowledge, five district judges confronting the issue imposed that requirement, and only one district judge (the court
below) refused to do so.216 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit’s holding makes it more difficult to find remote tippees liable under Rule
10b-5.
As to the initial tippers’ “personal benefit,” the court said:
The circumstantial evidence in this case was simply
too thin to warrant the inference that the corporate
insiders received any personal benefit in exchange
for their tips. As to the Dell tips, the Government established that Goyal and Ray were not “close”
friends, but had known each other for years, having
both attended business school and worked at Dell together. Further, Ray, who wanted to become a Wall
Street analyst like Goyal, sought career advice and
assistance from Goyal. The evidence further showed
that Goyal advised Ray on a range of topics, from
discussing the qualifying examination in order to become a financial analyst to editing Ray’s résumé and
sending it to a Wall Street recruiter, and that some of
this assistance began before Ray began to provide
tips about Dell’s earnings. The evidence also established that Lim and Choi were “family friends” that
had met through church and occasionally socialized
together. The Government argues that these facts
were sufficient to prove that the tippers derived some
For discussion of a possible special Rule 10b-5 insider trading solicitude for analysts, see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
214
See Newman, 773 F.3d at 451–55, cert. denied, 2015 WL 4575840 (U.S.,
Oct. 5, 2015). In Newman, the government did not charge the defendants with
mail/wire fraud. See id. at 442–43.
215
See id. at 442, 447–50.
216
See id. at 449–50.
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benefit from the tip. We disagree. If this was a “benefit,” practically anything would qualify. . . . .
[T]he Government may [not] prove the receipt of a
personal benefit by the mere fact of a friendship, particularly of a casual or social nature . . . . To the extent Dirks suggests that a personal benefit may be inferred from a personal relationship between the tipper and tippee, where the tippee’s trades “resemble
trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of
the profits to the recipient,” see 463 U.S. at 664, . . .
we hold that such an inference is impermissible in the
absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.
In other words, as Judge Walker noted in Jiau, this
requires evidence of “a relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo
from the latter, or an intention to benefit the [latter].”217
217

Id. at 451–52 (quoting United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.
2013)) (emphasis added).
For a discussion of Newman, see Jodi L Avergun & Douglas H. Fischer, Friends
With Benefits: Second Circuit Overturns Newman and Chiasson Convictions and
Raises the Government’s Burden in Insider Trading Cases Against Tippees, (Dec.
12, 2014), http://bna.com/friends-benefits-second-n17179918853; Robert Hoff,
Richard Levan, & Ivana Greco, The Gift of ‘Newman’: Not All Tippers Benefit
from Sharing Confidential Information, (N.Y.L.J. Feb. 9, 2015),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202717100248/The-Gift-of-Newman;
Gregory Morvillo & Eugene Ingoglia, Impact of ‘Newman’ in Other Insider Trading
Cases,
(N.Y.L.J.
Feb.
5,
2015)
www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202717054038/Impact-of-Newma-in-Other-Insider-TradingCases?slreturn=20150631103413; Subcommittee on Annual Review, Committee
on Federal Regulation of Securities, ABA Section of Business Law, Annual Review of Federal Securities Regulation, 70 BUS. LAW. 923–26 (2014–2015);
Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading (Ind. Legal Res. Paper No. 327, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2665820; Adam C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 69 SMU L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015); Strader, supra note 21.
For a description of the decision by federal prosecutors to drop charges against
five insider trading defendants in light of Newman, see Christopher M. Matthews,
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Dirks emphasizes that the tipper’s “personal benefit” may be direct or indirect and gives the following examples: (1) pecuniary
gain, (2) an enhancement of reputation that will translate into future
Insider Charges Are Being Dropped, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2015, at C3, col. 1. For
a description of a federal district court decision to allow four of these insider trading defendants to withdraw guilty pleas in light of Newman, see Christopher M.
Matthews, Insider-Trading Defendants Allowed to Retract Guilty Pleas, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 23, 2015, at C3, col. 1. For a decision partially relying on Newman to
grant summary judgment against the plaintiff in a private civil complaint against
an alleged insider trader, see Gordon v. Sonar Capital Mgmt., 2015 WL 4554194
(S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2015). For a description of Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet
Bharara’s decision to seek dismissal of charges against seven insider trading defendants, see Christopher M. Matthews & Aruna Viswanatha, Prosecutor Pulls
Plug on Insider Charges, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 2015, at 1. See generally, Christopher M. Matthews, Prosecutors’ Unlikely Ally: Judge: Rakoff’s rulings question
appellate court’s decision on insider trading cases, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2015,
at C3.
In Newman, the United States filed a brief petitioning for a rehearing or rehearing
en banc. See Petition of the United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing
En Banc, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1837),
2015 WL 1064423.
The SEC filed an amicus brief supporting the petition of the United States for
rehearing or rehearing en banc. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petition of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir.
2014) (No. 13-1837).
For the opposition briefs of the defendants, see Brief of Defendant-Appellant Anthony Chiasson in Opposition to the United States of America’s Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir.
2014) (No. 13-1837); Brief of Defendant-Appellant Todd Newman in Opposition
to the United States of America’s Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc,
United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1837).
For some amicus opposition briefs, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professors
Stephen Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson, and Jonathan Macey in Opposition to
the United States of America’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, United States v.
Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1837), 2015 WL 1064409; Brief
for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the New York
Council of Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae Opposing the Petition of the United
States for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d
438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1837), 2015 WL 1064411); Brief of Amicus Curiae
Mark Cuban in Opposition to the United States of America’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 131837), 2015 WL 1064412.
The Second Circuit refused to rehear the case. See United States v. Newman, 2015
WL 1954058 (Apr. 3, 2015). The Supreme Court denied certiorari. See United
States v. Newman, 2015 WL 4575840 (U.S., Oct. 5, 2015).
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earnings, (3) an expectation of reciprocal tips or other items of value,
and (4) the gift of confidential information to a friend or relative.218
As to the last example, Dirks states: “The elements of fiduciary
duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an
insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative
or friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself
followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”219
This illustration involves a vicarious benefit: feeling better off
solely because someone else is better off, with no necessary expectation of a quid pro quo. If a parent conveys material nonpublic information to a child, the parent may feel better off regardless of any
quid pro quo. The economist, Professor Kenneth E. Boulding, described such a vicarious benefit as “benevolence.”220
One possible reason why the Supreme Court adopted the “personal benefit” requirement for the initial tipper is that, in certain situations, some sort of “personal benefit” requirement may be necessary to avoid an unjust result:
The “personal benefit” test may be necessary to distinguish between proper and improper tips . . . . Suppose an individual conveys material nonpublic information to a friend, who is also the individual’s attorney. Surely, no [violation] . . . occurs if the individual
conveys the information in the course of obtaining
legal advice as to whether trading on the information
would be legal. In contrast, [a violation] . . . might
occur if the individual is conveying the information

218

See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663–64 (1983). For a discussion of
demonstrating the tipper’s “personal benefit,” see WANG & STEINBERG, supra
note 1, § 5.2.8[C], at 390–93.
219
463 U.S. at 664.
220
See Kenneth E. Boulding, Economics as a Moral Science, 59 AM. ECON.
REV. 1, 6 (1969) (“[I]nterdependence of utility functions. . . .We . . . rejoice when
they rejoice . . . .”) (presidential address delivered at the Eighty-first meeting of
the American Economic Association, Chicago, Illinois, December 29, 1968;
available on internet).
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with the intent that the attorney sell his/her holdings
based on the information.221
Alternatively, a patient may disclose material nonpublic information to her psychiatrist without expecting that the psychiatrist
would trade on the information. Criminal liability for the patient
seems improper.222 In addition, a whistleblower might disclose information to an investigative journalist or investigative stock analyst
without anticipating that the journalist or analyst would trade or tip
others who trade.223 In this way, the “personal benefit” requirement
protects innocent individuals.
If the reason for the “personal benefit” requirement is to avoid
inappropriate liability for the “tipper” in patient/psychiatrist, attorney/client, whistleblower/journalist, and similar scenarios, the Newman definition of Rule 10b-5 “personal benefit” would be overly
narrow.224
In Dirks v. SEC,225 the Supreme Court explained why the “personal benefit” requirement is distinct from scienter.226 Nevertheless,

221

WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.4, at 474 (footnote omitted). For
a somewhat similar example of a commuter on a train discussing confidential information that can be overheard by an eavesdropping stranger or, alternatively,
by a day-trader/friend of the commuter whom the commuter knows is within earshot, see SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 287 (2d Cir. 2012).
222
The mail fraud and securities fraud insider trading case of United States v.
Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), involved similar facts, but the defendant was the psychiatrist and not the patient. See id. at 270. For additional discussion of Willis, see supra note 137.
223
Dirks v. SEC itself held that a whistleblower did not violate Rule 10b-5 by
disclosing to an analyst material nonpublic information about a massive fraud at
the whistleblower’s former employer. See 463 U.S. 646, 649–50, 666–67 (1983).
224
For the Newman definition, see supra text accompanying note 217.
225
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
226
See id. at 663 (“Scienter in some cases is relevant in determining whether
the tipper has violated his Cady, Roberts duty. But to determine whether the disclosure itself ‘deceive[s], manipulate[s], or defraud[s]’ shareholders . . . the initial
inquiry is whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider. This requires
courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or
indirect personal benefit from the disclosure . . . .”); id. at 663 n.23 (“The issue in
this case, however, is not whether Secrist or Dirks acted with scienter, but rather
whether there was any deceptive or fraudulent conduct at all, i.e., whether
Secrist’s disclosure constituted a breach of his fiduciary duty and thereby caused
injury to shareholders.”). For discussion of Dirks’ distinction between scienter
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in situations like that of the patient/psychiatrist, attorney/client, and
even the whistleblower/journalist, the distinction between scienter
and “personal benefit” may be blurry.
With mail/wire fraud, at least a mild form of the “personal benefit” test may be necessary to prevent unjust “tipper” liability in the
patient/psychiatrist, client/attorney, whistleblower/journalist, and
similar situations.
As noted at the end of Part I, mail/wire fraud is an inchoate crime
that requires nothing more than devising a scheme and causing a
requisite use of the mail or wires to begin implementation of the
scheme.227 Suppose one or more persons devise an insider trading
scheme and cause the required use of the mail or wires. For
mail/wire fraud, one question would be whether the scheme must
contemplate (1) for initial tipper liability that she receive a “personal
benefit,” however defined, and/or (2) for tippee liability that she
know or should know of the initial tipper’s violation (and possibly
the initial tipper’s improper “personal benefit”).228
Few courts have addressed whether the Rule 10b-5 tipper/tippee
requirements apply to the mail/wire fraud liability of tippers and tippees. One commentator has noted: “Whether courts would adopt
such [a “personal benefit” test for mail/wire fraud tipper liability]
is an open question. Nothing in Carpenter explicitly requires it.”229
and “personal benefit,” see Pritchard, supra note 217, parts II and III. For additional discussion of the distinction between scienter and “personal benefit,” see
SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 286-87 (2d Cir. 2012).
The Rule 10b-5 insider trading case of United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438,
446-47 (2d Cir. 2014), separately discussed “personal benefit” and scienter/mensrea and defined the latter as follows: “We have defined willfulness in this context
`as a realization on the defendant’s part that he was doing a wrongful act under
the securities laws.’” Id. at 447 (quoting United States v. Cassese, 482 F.3d 921,
98 (2d Cir. 2005)).
227
See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the requisite use of the mail or wires, see supra Part II(A). The use of the mail or wire
may be by an innocent party or by an associate of the defendant. See supra notes
26–30 and accompanying text.
228
For a discussion of the Dirks tests for Rule 10b-5 tipper and tippee liability,
see supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the recent
Second Circuit decision making it harder for the prosecution to satisfy these tests,
see supra notes 216–28 and accompanying text.
229
Dreeben, supra note 83, at 214; cf. Helen A. Garten, Insider Trading in the
Corporate Interest, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 573, 638 n.287 (1987) (the uncertainty
created by the “personal benefit” requirement for tipper liability “will increase if
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In Carpenter,230 one of two authors of the Wall Street Journal
“Heard on the Street” column, R. Foster Winans, gave advance information about the contents of his column to both his roommate,
David Carpenter, and to Peter Brant, Kenneth Felis, and David
Clark.231 Brant, Felis, and Clark traded on the information, and
Winans, Brant, Felis, and Clark shared the profits.232
With no discussion of why Carpenter was an aider and abettor,
the Supreme Court affirmed his mail/wire fraud conviction for aiding and abetting.233 Although the Court frequently described Winans
and Felis as mail/wire fraud co-conspirators,234 it felt no need to explain why, probably because Winans and Felis shared profits.235 The
Court simply stated: “We have little trouble in holding that the conspiracy here to trade on the Journal’s confidential information is not
outside the reach of the mail and wire fraud statutes, provided the
other elements of the offense are satisfied.”236 As to the element of
intent of those to whom Winans conveyed the information, the Court
said only: “[T]he District Court’s conclusion that each of the petitioners acted with the required specific intent to defraud is strongly
supported by the evidence.”237
Nor did the Second Circuit’s decision in Carpenter explore why
under mail/wire fraud Carpenter was liable as an aider and abettor
and Winans and Felis were liable as co-conspirators.238 As to the
mail/wire fraud required specific intent of Winans and Felis, the circuit court simply stated: “it is sufficient that the district court found
more insider trading cases are prosecuted under the federal mail and wire fraud
statutes . . . .”).
In United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), the government did not
charge the defendants with mail/wire fraud. See id. at 442–43.
230
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). For additional discussion
of Carpenter, see supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text, 63–83 and accompanying text.
231
See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 22–23.
232
See id. at 23.
233
See id. at 22, 25–28.
234
See id. at 23, 27–28.
235
See id. at 23.
236
Id. at 28.
237
Id.
238
See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026, 1034–35 (2d Cir.
1986), aff’d in part, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (affirming wire fraud and mail fraud convictions).
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that Winans and Felis intended to deceive and defraud the Journal . . . .”239
The trial court, however, did briefly discuss why Carpenter was
liable as an aider and abettor under both the securities and mail/wire
fraud statutes:
During his one and a half years at the WSJ, he became aware of the rules of the game and consequently knew that what Winans was doing was a
fraud on the WSJ. He endorsed the checks made out
to him by Brant or Felis, allowed Winans to trade in
his name in the Merrill Lynch and Schwab accounts,
and to that extent willfully participated in the criminal venture and helped it succeed.240
The district court also found that Carpenter was not a co-conspirator because the Government had not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that he had ever reached an agreement with the other conspirators; nor did Carpenter receive a share of the profits.241
Finally, the trial court addressed why Winans and Felis were part
of a conspiracy, which the opinion found began on October 16,
1983, when Winans and Brant agreed to trade on advance information about the columns. Felis agreed to participate soon afterwards; pursuant to the agreement, the parties traded in advance of
the columns and split the profits.242 As to intent, the trial court explained:
The government must also establish that the defendants acted with specific intent, a discussion equally
applicable to the mail, wire and securities fraud
counts [citing the discussion of scienter in Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 n.23 (1983)]. . . .
The essence of the defendants’ argument is that to
have intended to defraud the Wall Street Journal,
239

Id. at 1035.
United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d,
791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff’d in part, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (affirming wire
fraud and mail fraud convictions).
241
See id. at 848–49.
242
See id. at 831–38, 848.
240
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each defendant would have to know the specifics of
the conflicts of interest policy . . . .
We do not agree that the specific intent requirement
is meant to be quite that specific. Nor do we believe
that such a precise knowledge of what type of wrong
Winans was committing at the Journal is necessary
to show that any defendant aided and abetted the
fraud. The government is not required to prove actual
knowledge by each defendant, of every detail that
made the scheme a fraudulent one . . . .
Our focus is on whether the defendants intended to
deceive the Journal, or aided and abetted Winans in
his efforts to deceive the Journal. The defendants
need not have known about every particular of the
conflicts of interest policy to have knowledge that the
Wall Street Journal was being defrauded by Winans
for his own financial gain . . . .243
Because Carpenter involved a conspiracy to share information
and split profits, none of the opinions had to discuss the tests for
tipper and tippee liability.244
As discussed earlier,245 United States v. Ruggiero,246 was a
“classical relationship” insider trading case that affirmed the Rule
10b-5 convictions of a tippee using the test: “knew or should have
known” of the initial insider/tipper’s violation.247 After affirming
the Rule 10b-5 convictions, the court relied on its Rule 10b-5 discussion to affirm summarily the wire fraud convictions of the tippee
with virtually no analysis and with possible implicit adoption of the
“knew of should have known” test but no express mention of it.248
In his dissent in United States v. Chestman, Judge Winter commented:
243

Id. at 847.
For a discussion of these tests under SEC Rule 10b-5, see supra notes 216–
29 and accompanying text.
245
See supra notes 167–76 and accompanying text.
246
56 F.3d 647 (5th Cir.1995).
247
See id. at 653–56.
248
See id. at 656. For a quotation from this part of the opinion, see supra text
accompanying note 175.
244
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I am unclear as to whether the [tipper’s] breach of
duty and the tippee’s knowledge of that breach as required by Dirks is coextensive with the similar requirements in [the mail/wire fraud decision] in Carpenter. The Dirks rule is derived from securities law,
and its limitation to information obtained through a
breach of fiduciary duty is, as noted, influenced by
the need to allow persons to profit from generating
information about firms so that the pricing of securities is efficient. The Carpenter rule, however, is derived from the law of theft or embezzlement, and a
tippee’s liability may be governed by rules concerning the possession of stolen property. Logic is therefore not a barrier to the growth of disparate rules concerning a tippee’s liability depending on whether
Section 10(b) or mail fraud is the source of law.
However, because under any such disparity in rules
the Section 10(b) charge would be harder to prove
than a mail fraud charge, I need not explore the issue
further.249
Earlier, this Article discussed whether Judge Winter was correct
that mail/wire fraud liability would be more difficult to prove.250
When discussing the specific intent to defraud required to convict a remote tippee under Rule 10b-5, Judge Rakoff said the required intent should be the same for both Rule 10b-5 and mail/wire
fraud:
But where, as in this case, the Government charges a
scheme to defraud under subdivision (a) of Rule
10b–5, proving specific intent to defraud is necessary. Indeed, were it otherwise, an insider trading defendant charged, in virtually identical words, with violating both the mail fraud statute and Rule 10b–5,
249

United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 581–82 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(Winter, J., dissenting). For additional discussion of Judge Winter’s dissent, see
supra notes 119–37 and accompanying text. For discussion of possible special
Rule 10b-5 insider trading solicitude for analysts, see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
250
See supra notes 123–37 and accompanying text.
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could be convicted of the latter but acquitted of the
former, even though the latter is a specialized subspecies of the former.251
In the course of holding that the evidence was sufficient to support a tippee’s conviction for both securities fraud and mail fraud, a
much earlier district court opinion said of both securities and mail
fraud: “it is sufficient if the government shows that [the initial misappropriator/tipper] breached a duty and [the remote tippee] knew
of that breach.”252
In any event, few opinions have directly addressed the issue of
whether the Dirks tests for Rule 10b-5 tipper and tippee liability apply to a mail/wire fraud tipper and tippee.
6. “WHILE IN POSSESSION OF MATERIAL NONPUBLIC
INFORMATION” VERSUS “ON THE BASIS OF MATERIAL
NONPUBLIC INFORMATION”
In United States v. O’Hagan,253 the Eighth Circuit reserved the
question of whether an insider trading defendant convicted of
mail/wire fraud must have traded “while in possession of material
nonpublic information” versus “on the basis of material nonpublic
information.”254
251

United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012),
aff’d, 555 Fed. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014). For additional discussion of Whitman,
see supra note 137. For a discussion of commentary on the derivation of Exchange
Act Section 10(b) from the mail fraud statute, see id.
252
United States v. Victor Teicher & Co., L.P., 785 F. Supp. 1137, 1150
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
253
139 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 1998) (heard on remand from United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997)).
254
See 139 F.3d at 653.
The insider trading case of United States v. Ruggiero affirmed the Rule 10b-5
convictions using the “in possession of” language with no discussion of the issue
of “possession” versus “on the basis of.” See 56 F.3d 647, 653–56 (5th Cir.1995).
After affirming the Rule 10b-5 convictions, the court affirmed the wire fraud convictions with virtually no discussion and no mention of “possession” or “use.” See
id. at 656. For additional discussion of Ruggiero, see supra notes 167–76 and
accompanying text, 253–55 and accompanying text.
The court in United States v. Cherif, a mail/wire fraud stock market insider trading
case, used the language “trading on the basis of fraudulently obtained confidential
information,” but did not address the issue of “possession” versus “on the basis
of.” See 943 F.2d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 1991). The court also held that the defendant
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The insider trading portion of United States v. Royer255 discussed wire fraud and Rule 10b-5 misappropriation convictions
jointly and affirmed them.256 Without distinguishing between wire
fraud and Rule 10b-5, the court adopted the “knowing possession of
the material nonpublic information” as opposed to the “use of the
information” test.257
Because of the paucity of cases, the issue remains unresolved.
When eventually answering this question, the courts may borrow
from the decisions addressing the same issue under SEC Rule 10b5,258 especially prior to the adoption of SEC Rule 10b5-1.259
CONCLUSION
After the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Carpenter v.
United States,260 the federal mail and wire fraud statutes became potent prosecutorial weapons against insider trading when the information-owner is the victim.
SEC Rules 14e-3261 and 10b-5 cover a great deal of stock market
insider trading and tipping, but certainly not all.262 For many reasons, the Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” theory may not be
available for insider trading and tipping. One possible example is a
corporate insider trading in the company’s debt instruments; it is unclear whether she has a “classical relationship” with the party on the
other side of the trade.
had waived his argument that the trial court had “failed to instruct the jury that it
had to find that confidential business information was a `substantial or motivating
factor’ for his stock trades.” Id.
255
549 F.3d 886, 897–99 (2d Cir. 2008).
256
See id. at 897–99.
257
See id. at 899 (citing the Rule 10b-5 case of United States v. Teicher, 987
F.2d 112, 119–21 (2d Cir. 1993)). For discussion of Teicher, see WANG &
STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4.4.5, at 176–77.
258
For a discussion of this issue under SEC Rule 10b-5, see WANG &
STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4.4.5.
259
For a discussion of SEC Rule 10b5-1, see id. § 4.4.5, nn.416–34 and accompanying text.
260
484 U.S. 19 (1987).
261
For discussion of SEC Rule 14e-3, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1,
ch. 9.
262
Rule 14e-3 is confined to the tender offer context. See id. § 9.1. For discussion of the application of SEC Rule 10b-5 to insider trading, see id., chs. 4, 5.
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With stock market insider trading and tipping, an alternative to
the Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” theory is Rule 10b-5 misappropriation. Somewhat similar to Rule 10b-5 misappropriation is
mail/wire fraud on the confidential information owner. This latter
breach might be more extensive than, co-extensive with, or less extensive than Rule 10b-5 misappropriation (although Rule 10b-5 does
not apply to inside trading of an item not a “security” under the federal securities laws, e.g., commodities).
Suppose, however, neither Rule 10b-5 misappropriation nor
mail/wire fraud on the information-owner is available, perhaps because the information source/owner gave permission to trade or tip
or possibly because the defendant disclosed in advance to the information source/owner the plan to trade or tip.
In that situation, another possible victim of mail/wire fraud is the
party on the other side of the insider trade. Uncertain is whether, for
stock market insider traders, the necessary mail/wire fraud relationship is broader, narrower, or the same as the requisite Rule 10b-5
“classical relationship.” Thus far, virtually no courts have considered the insider trader’s mail/wire fraud duty to disclose to the party
on the other side of the transaction. Under mail/wire fraud, a stock
market insider trader might conceivably have a duty to disclose to
the party on the other side even in the absence of a Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship.”
Another issue unexamined by the courts is whether an employee
engaging in an insider trade of her company’s stock could be criminally liable under two different mail/wire fraud theories with two
separate mail/wire fraud victims: the information owner and the
party on the other side of the trade.
With stock market insider trading for mail/wire fraud, the materiality standard may be: (1) laxer—less stringent than the “reasonable person” test—or in cases involving deprivation of informational
property, (2) different, dealing with the importance to the owner of
the information as opposed to a stock market investor. Consequently, the government may be able to use mail/wire fraud when
SEC Rule 10b-5 does not apply.
Under the Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” theory and probably the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine, the initial tipper must
receive a “personal benefit.” Under the Rule 10b-5 “classical rela-
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tionship” theory and probably the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine, each direct and remote tippee must “know or should know” of
the initial tipper’s violation.
It is unclear whether these requirements apply to the mail/wire
fraud liability of tippers and tippees. Again, were the standards laxer
for mail/wire fraud, the government would be able to use mail/wire
fraud when Rule 10b-5 does not apply. For example, where courts,
like the Second Circuit, make it harder to meet the Rule 10b-5 tests
for tipper and tippee liability, 263 prosecutors may turn to the
mail/fraud statutes for convictions.
With stock market insider trading, several Supreme Court Justices264 and Judge Ralph K. Winter265 have said that mail/wire fraud
is broader than Exchange Act Section 10(b)/SEC Rule 10b-5.266 In
the insider trading case O’Hagan, the Supreme Court said: “Just as
in Carpenter, so here, the ‘mail fraud charges are independent of
[the] securities fraud charges, even [though] both rest on the same
set of facts.’”267
In short, for stock market insider trading, some elements of liability may be different and possibly easier to satisfy under mail/wire
fraud than under SEC Rule 10b-5. The courts have largely failed to
explore these differences.

263

See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 446–55 (2d Cir. 2014). For a
discussion of Newman, see supra notes 216–28 and accompanying text. In Newman, the government did not charge the defendants with mail/wire fraud. See 773
F.3d at 442–43.
264
See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text.
265
See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 581–82 (2d Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (Winter, J., dissenting). For additional discussion of this portion of Judge
Winter’s dissent, see supra notes 119–23, 256 and accompanying text.
266
In the words of one commentator: “if fraud under the securities laws cannot
be established, the securities fraud claims fail, but the mail and wire fraud claims
may still stand. . . .Notwithstanding the overlap that occurs in cases, what might
be fraud in a mail fraud . . . context is not necessarily fraud in a securities law
context.” Joanna B. Apolinsky, The Boundaries of Fraud Under the Insider Trading Rules, 13 FLA ST. U. BUS. REV. 1, 26–28 (2014) (footnotes omitted).
267
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 678 (1997) (bracketed material in
original) (quoting Brief for United States 46–47).

